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As the revelations in the so-called “NSA data scandal” have recently shown,1
privacy remains a relevant and pressing issue which is discussed all over the
world. Since computers are developing further, it has become unproblematic for
the state to observe its citizens. New technologies make it effortless to put a trace
on an individual’s telephone without the need for human listeners. This allows
for the danger of broad-spectrum wiretap activities. Furthermore, people
increasingly utilize electronic forms of communication (E-Mail, chat, etc.),
making it easier for the state to gain information compared to the previous
decades where letters had to be manually opened. The invention of new
technologies amplifies the capabilities of law enforcement authorities constantly,
which often infringe on the defendant’s right to privacy (e.g. IMSI-catcher, access
to electronic communication, tracking of IP addresses, etc.).2 Thus, as Jonathan
Burchell concludes, “threats to individual privacy are greater now than ever
envisaged, even by an Aldous Huxley or George Orwell.”3
The constitutional right to privacy is not absolute in the majority of cases.4 The
state must have an ability to access its citizens’ data in order to solve crimes,
employ people (background checks), collect taxes, compile statistical data, pay
subsidies, check applications for asylum, etc. In this respect, states are
increasingly confronted with the key issue, at which point there is an appropriate
balance between handling public tasks (such as a functioning criminal justice)
and an individual’s right to privacy. The effective scope of the right of privacy is
determined by the principle of proportionality.5 Only by balancing the conflicting
1 See A. Maurer, “Why the NSA PRISM program should terrify America”, in: The Washington Times,
25.08.2013, available online: http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-pill-
blue-bill/2013/aug/25/metadata-matters-ongoing-nsa-scandal/
2 C. Gusy, in: VerwArch 2010, p. 319 et seq.; M. Gercke/P. W. Brunst, Praxishandbuch
Internetstrafrecht, § 5 et seq.
3 J. Burchell, in: EJCL 2009, p. 1.
4 For the South African constitution: McQuiod-Mason, Constitutional law of South Africa, Art. 38.5
(a); for the German constitution: H. Dreier, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal
note 68; M. Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien, p. 281; for the ECHR: Leander v. Sweden, no.
9248/81, 26 March 1987.
5 For the South African constitution: McQuiod-Mason, Constitutional law of South Africa, Art. 38.5
(a); for the German constitution: H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Vol. 1, Art.
2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 87; similar: H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker (ed), Grundrechte-












interests can it be determined which particular sector of the right to privacy the
state is not allowed to enter.6 Accordingly, the principle of proportionality is the
core of the examination of the constitutional justification of the right to privacy. 7
The factor of proportionality is intended to prevent the state from “cracking a
walnut with a sledgehammer”8. Therefore, it establishes whether or not a
balanced relation between ends and means exists. The aim of the dissertation is
to analyse how the factor of proportionality influences the right of the state to
infringe on the right of privacy in the South African and the German Constitution.
This problem is of great practical importance. In many states there is a “legal
explosion,“9 in which the legislature and jurisprudence attempt to weigh the
balance between the protection of a man‘s right to privacy and the legitimate
interest of a state to obtain information (e.g. for the investigation of crimes).10
Proportionality plays a role primarily for surveillance measures, as the citizen’s
risk of degenerating to a “transparent society” rises steadily due to the increasing
mechanization and performance of computer systems. This problem is also
evident on other sectors of the right to privacy. For instance, German
commentators regard the right to choose life-prolonging or life-sustaining
measures in medical situations as protected by the right to privacy, since this is
part of a person’s autonomy.11 This right is becoming progressively important,
since the society is aging and medicine is improving. These new findings make
life-prolonging measures possible over longer periods. In this situation, the
patient can argue using his/her right to privacy whether he/she wishes to make
Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal note 98, for the ECHR: J. A. Frowein, in: Frowein/Peukert, Vorb.
Art. 8 - 11 EMRK, marginal note. 17; J. Pätzold, in: Karpenstein/Mayer, EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK,
marginal note 97.
6 T. Mayen, Der grundrechtliche Informationsanspruch des Forschers gegenüber dem Staat, p. 118 et
seq., with further references.
7 H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker (ed), Grundrechte-Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 98.
8 T. Henne, in: DVBl. 2002, p. 1094.
9 J. H. Barton, in: Stanford Law Review 1975, p. 567; G. Duttge, in: Der Staat 1997, p. 281 et seq.
10 See: G. Duttge, in: Der Staat 1997, p. 281 et seq.












use of these opportunities.12 The exact boundaries and conditions of this claim,
however, have to be defined at the level of proportionality.











§ 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A) The constitutional right to privacy in the Republic of South Africa
The right to privacy is a central right in the South African Constitution since it is
connected to human dignity.13 Moreover, many personal autonomy rights were
“flagrantly invaded”14 under the apartheid state in South Africa and the state
engaged in “widespread abuse of rights protecting information”15. Most of this
offensive legislation upon which the abuse was predicated has been repealed
today.16 The constitutional right to privacy is protected by section 14 of the 1996
South African constitution. According to this, “everyone has the right to privacy,
which includes the right protecting one’s self or one’s home from being searched,
their property searched, their possessions seized or the privacy of their
communications infringed.” Whereas most constitutions (including the German
constitution) protect the general right of personality and specific infringements
of privacy like searches, seizures and infringements of the privacy of
communications in separate secti ns, the South African constitution guarantees
all these rights in one section.17
The South African Constitutional Court defines privacy as “an individual
condition of life characterised by seclusion from the public and publicity [which]
implies an absence of acquaintance with the individual or his personal affairs in
this state”.18 This definition is only able to give a general framework, since it is
too broad to subsume all specific facts of privacy. Thus, the scope of the right to
privacy has to be defined by case law and is open to changes19.
13O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 3 SA 244 (C) 247F-249D; Universiteit van
Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 441 (A) 455H-456H; I. Currie/J. de Waal,
The Bill of Rights Handbook, p. 275; J. Neethling/J. M. Potgieter/P. J. Visser, Law of delict, p. 333.
14 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.3 (a) (i) (aa).
15 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.3 (a) (i) (bb).
16 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.3 (a) (i) (bb).
17 I. Currie/J. de Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, Chapter 14.1.
18 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para 68.
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B) The constitutional right to privacy in the Federal Republic of
Germany
I. The constitutional right to privacy in the German constitution
Other than in the South African constitution there is no explicit right to privacy
in the German constitution.20 The German Federal Constitutional Court (herein
after referred to as the Bundesverfassungsgericht) deduced the right of privacy
from the general freedom of action21 [Section 2(1) of the Basic law – hereinafter
referred to as Grundgesetz (GG) –] in conjunction with human dignity [Section
1(1) GG].22 Presently, the so-called “general right of personality” is accepted as
20 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para 77.
21 According to the general freedom of action every person is allowed to do whatever he/she wants
to do. The state always needs a justification, when it limits this right, no matter how trivial the
prohibition is, see: BVerfGE 6, 32 (36) [Elfes]; BVerfGE 80, 137 (152 et seq.) [Reiten im Walde];
BVerfGE 113, 88 (103) [Streikeinsatz von Beamten]; BVerfGE 115, 97 (109)
[Halbteilungsgrundsatz]; U. Di Fabio, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number
12; H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, vol 1, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal
number 27; V. Epping, Grundrechte, marginal number 547; C. Starck, in:
von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, GG I, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 8; B. Pieroth/B. Schlink,
Grundrechte, marginal number 414; H. D. Jarass, in: Jarass/Pieroth, Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG,
marginal number 2 f.; J. F. Lindner, Theorie der Grundrechtsdogmatik, S. 455; H.-U. Gallwas,
Grundrechte, marginal nuber 282; H. Sodan, in: Beck'scher Kompakt-Kommentar zum
Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 12; H. Hofmann, in: Schmidt-
Bleibtreu/Hofmann/Hopfauf (eds), GG, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 22; K. Stern, Das
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol IV/1, p. 883 ff.; A. Burghart, in:
Leibholz/Rinck, GG, Bd. I, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 21.
22 BVerfGE 120, 224 (238) [Geschwisterbeischlaf]; BVerfGE 65, 1 (41) [Volkszählung]; C.
Degenhart, in: JuS 1992, p. 361 et seq.; W. Kahl, Die Schutzergänzungsfunktion von Art. 2 Abs. 1
Grundgesetz, p. 6 et seq.; I. Härtel, in: Grote/Härtel/Hain et al., Die Ordnung der Freiheit, p. 235;
J. Isensee, in: Merten/Papier, Handbuch der Grundrechte in Deutschland und Europa, § 26, marginal
number 56; U. Di Fabio, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 128; H. Dreier,
in: H. Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Vol. 1, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 68; H.
Sodan, in: Beck'scher Kompakt-Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 5; D.
Murswiek, in: M. Sachs (ed), Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 63; I. Härtel, in:
Grote/Härtel/Hain et al., Die Ordnung der Freiheit, p. 235; H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker (eds),
Grundrechte-Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 35 et seq.; M. Borowski, Grundrechte als
Prinzipien, p. 275; C. Starck, in: von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, GG I, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal
number 15; C. Drews, Die Wesensgehaltsgarantie des Art. 19 II GG, p. 259; N. Teifke, Das Prinzip
Menschenwürde, p. 16; A. Katz, Staatsrecht, § 30 I, marginal number 676; M. Baston-Vogt, Der
sachliche Schutzbereich des zivilrechtlichen allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts, p. 117; P. Kunig,
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an independent23 human right.24 The general right of personality is supposed to
complement the explicitly mentioned fundamental rights – such as freedom of
belief (Section 4 GG) or freedom of speech [Section 5(1) GG] – and ensures that
the basic conditions of the supreme constitutional principle of human dignity
[Section 1(1) GG] are preserved by creating a “protected personal sphere of
life”.25 Due the breadth of the concept of a “protected personal sphere of life" and
the rapidly changing social and moral value system, there can be no exact
definition of the general right of personality.26 As a result, the jurisprudence
emphasizes that the general right of personality is open to development27 and
overcomes this problem by providing examples28. As a matter of course, these
categories can, due to the capacity for development, only be generic for the right
to privacy and result from the wide-ranging concept of personality being very
versatile.29
23 A. Podlech, in: Denninger/Hoffmann-Riem/Schneider/Stein (eds), AK-GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, §
59a; W. v. Heintschel-Heinegg/N. Pallas, Grundrechte, marginal number 258.
24 W. Cremer, Freiheitsgrundrechte, p. 464; M. Sachs, Verfassungsrecht II, B2, marginal number 59;
H. Sodan, in: Beck'scher Kompakt-Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 9;
A. Burghart, in: Leibholz/Rinck, GG, Vol. I, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 4.
25 C. Hillgruber, in: Umbach/Clemens (ed), Grundgesetz, Vol. I, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number
45; H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker (eds), Grundrechte-Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 34;
P. Byers, Die Videoüberwachung am Arbeitsplatz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des neuen §
32 BDSG, p. 37.
26 D. Lorenz, in: JZ 2005, p. 1125; H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker (eds), Grundrechte-Kommentar, Art.
2 GG, marginal number 37.
27 BVerfGE 54, 148 (153 et seq.) [Eppler]; BVerfGE 65, 1 (41) [Volkszählung]; BVerfGE 79, 256
(268) [Kenntnis der eigenen Abstammung]; W. Schmitt Glaeser, in: Isensee/Kirchhof (ed),
Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2nd edition, Vol. VII, marginal number
129, marginal number 28; H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Vol. 1, Art. 2 Abs.
1 GG, marginal number 69; P. Kunig, in: von Münch/Kunig (eds), Vol. I, Art. 1 GG, marginal
number 10; E. Zech, Gewebebanken für Therapie und Forschung, p. 20; G. Manssen, Staatsrecht
II, marginal number 227; M. M. Meinke, In Verbindung mit, p. 64 et seq.; H.-U. Gallwas,
Grundrechte, marginal number 345.
28 Similiar: D. Grimm, in: Grimm/Schwerdtner, Schutz der Persönlichkeit, p. 4; H. D. Jarass, in:
Jarass/Pieroth, Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 39 et seq.; D. Murswiek, in: M. Sachs
(ed), Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 68 et seq.
29 C. Hillgruber, in: Umbach/Clemens (eds), Grundgesetz, Vol. I, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number
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II. The constitutional right to privacy in the European Convention on
Human Rights
Since the Federal Republic of Germany is a convention state of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the German jurisprudence has to consider
section 8 ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
when conducting the proportionality test for limitations of the general right of
personality.30 Thus, the paper has also to analyze Article 8 ECHR and the case law
of the European Court of Human Rights in order to get a complete picture of the
German legal situation.
According to Section 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights,
everyone has the right to respect for his/her private and family life, his/her home
and his/her correspondence. The protection of privacy in the European
Convention on Human Rights is not identical with the general right of
personality,31 but the two rights overlap in the first clause of Section 8(1) ECHR.32
Therefore, this provision fulfils the function of the general right of personality in
the European Convention on Human Rights.33
Like the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the European Court of Human Rights refuses
to provide an explicit definition of the right to privacy due to its complexity. 34
According to settled case law, Art 8(1) ECHR protects an area in which the holder
of the fundamental right can create and maintain an identity which guarantees
30 BVerfGE 111, 307 (317 – 318) [EGMR-Entscheidungen]; H. D. Jarass, in: Jarass/Pieroth,
Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 60; H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker (Hrsg.), Grundrechte-
Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 95; see for the structural explaination
„vökerrechtsfreundliche Auslegung“: H. Kube, in: Isensee/Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des
Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3rd edition, vol VII, marginal number 148, 90; J. M.
Schilling, Deutscher Grundrechtsschutz zwischen staatlicher Souveränität und menschenrechtlicher
Europäisierung, p. 59 et seq.; critical: R. Pfeffer, Das Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und Landesrecht,
p. 183 et seq.
31 J. Pätzold, in: Karpenstein/Mayer (eds), EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 2; T. Marauhn/K.
Meljnik, in: Grote/Marauhn (eds), EMRK/GG, Chapter 16, marginal number 7.
32 Similar: V. Epping, Grundrechte, marginal number 613.
33 R. Uerpmann-Wittzack, in: Ehlers (ed), Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, § 3,
marginal number 3.
34 Niemitz v. Germany, no. 13710/88, 16 December 1992, § 29, ECHR; Van Kück v. Germany, no.
35968/97 ECHR, 12. June 2003, Headnote 4; J. Pätzold, in: Karpenstein/Mayer (ed), EMRK, Art.
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the free development of the individual.35 This gives a person a negative right of
defence "in the sense of a right of a state-free area", and a positive claim against
the state (“positive obligations“36).37
35 Odièvre v. France, no. 42326/98 13 February 2003, Headnote 2, ECHR.
36 Mikulic v Croatia, no. 53176/99, § 65, ECHR 2002-I; K.H. v. Slowakia, no. 32881/04, 28. April
2009, § 45, ECHR.












§ 2 THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION
In this chapter we have to get an overview about the question to what extend the South
African constitution and the German Grundgesetz protect privacy, since the question
of justification can’t be analysed isolated from the scope of protection. Thus, the scope
of protection has first to be defined to determine which limitations need a justification
and a proportionality test. We will be able to compare the South African and the
German right to privacy better, if they are classified. They can be categorized into the
right to self-preservation, the protection against the publication of private facts and
the presentation of a person in a false light and appropriation, since these are the three
basic factors of the right to privacy.38 In the South African Constitution, these
categories are mostly shaped by pre-constitutional cases. In this respect, the
supremacy of the Constitution does not mean that all previous notions of privacy
will be forgotten and fall into disuse.39 The courts will inevitably retain those
existing common-law actions that are in harmony with the values of the
constitution.40
A) The right to self-preservation
The South African constitutional right to privacy protects people from intrusions
and interferences with private life.41 In pre-constitutional cases this right was
violated by illegally entering42 or bugging43 a person’s home, questioning a
prisoner improperly44, watching a person undressing45 or taking a bath46
38 M. Martini, in: JA 2009, p. 840; D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter
38.2 (a) (iii).
39 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.2.
40 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.2.
41 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.2 (a) (iii) (aa).
42 S v Boshoff 1981 (1) SA 393, 396 (T). S v I 1976 (1) SA 781 (RA); De Fourd v Council of Cape
Town (1898) 15 SC 399, 402.
43 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.2 (a) (iii) (aa).
44 Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 1993 (3) SA 131 (A); Gosschalk v Rossouw 1966 (2) SA 476, 492
(C).
45 R v R 1954 (2) SA 134, 135 (N); R v Daniels 1938 TPD 312, 313.
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secretly, observe a person,47 taking blood tests48 or tapping a person’s phone49
without permission and reading a person‘s private documents50 or
correspondence51 without authorization.52
Similarly, the German constitution guarantees a right to withdraw from contact.
This ensures that the confidentiality of personal matters is protected.53 The term
“withdrawal from contact” must be understood in a social and real way.54 Hence,
the scope of protection is congruent with the secrecy of postal, telegraphic and
telephonic communications [section 10(1) GG] and the right to inviolability of
the home [section 13(1) GG]. 55 The right to self-preservation also includes the
protection of private diary entries in criminal proceedings56 and acknowledges
the right to not receive unwanted advertisements.57 Moreover, the "right to
confidentiality and integrity of IT systems,” developed in 2008, protects
individuals from intelligence services that secretly monitor the internet.58
In the European Convention on Human Rights, section 8(1) establishes the
negative obligations in a state to the right to privacy in the narrow sense of the
word.59 This gives a person the right to establish a life on an individual‘s own
terms without state involvement in the decision-making process.60 Thus, a
protected sphere is created, in which a person lives his/her life according to
his/her choice and can develop his/her personality, as well as the ability to make
47 Epstein v Epstein 1987 (4) SA 606 (C).
48 C v Minister of Correctional Services 1996 (4) SA 292, 300 (T); Seetal v Pravitha & another NO
1983 (3) SA 827, 861-862 (D); M v R 1989 (1) SA 416, 426-7 (O); Nell v Nell 1990 (3) SA 889,
895-896 (T).
49 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.2 (a) (iii) (aa).
50 Reid-Daly v Hickman 1981 (2) SA 315, 323 (ZA).
51 S v Hammer 1994 (2) SACR 496, 498 (C).
52 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.2 (a) (iii) (aa).
53 M. Martini, in: JA 2009, p. 840.
54 B. Pieroth/B. Schlink, Grundrechte, marginal number 394.
55 D. Murswiek, in: M. Sachs (ed), Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 69.
56 BVerfGE 80, 367 (373 et seq.) [Tagebuch].
57 BVerfG NJW 1991, 910 [Werbepostsendungen].
58 BVerfGE 120, 274 (306) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
59 A. Peters/T. Altwicker, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 26 marginal number 1; C.
Grabenwarter/K. Pabel, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 22 marginal number 9.
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contact with other people, including sexual relations.61 The protection does not
end when the individual leaves the private space and acts in public, since a
person must – particularly in the context of demonstrations62 – have a possibility
to adjourn to a public space without observation.63 The right to self-preservation
comprises the confidentiality of communication contents and call data from state
interference (for example, by tapping telephone conversations and recording
them or secret recordings in a prison cell).64 In addition, it protects the
psychological and physical integrity of a human being.65 Therefore, every medical
examination or treatment which is executed under duress – even if it is only a
marginal medical act – is an infringement of section 8(1) ECHR.66
B) Protection against the publication of private facts and the
presentation of a person in a false light
South Africa’s constitutional right to privacy protects against the publication of
private facts and the presentation of a person in a false light.67 Here, the
disclosure or publishing of private facts which are obtained by illegal telephone
tapping,68 a police informer’s identity69, a story about young children abducted
from the custody of their parents,70 the content of stolen documents71 or
photographs of a retired schoolteacher portraying him as a young man in the
company of a well-known singer72 and the attempted photographing of security
policemen me tioned by counsel at a trial as having been responsible for the
61 J. Meyer-Ladewig, Art. 8 EMRK, § 7 with reference to P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, no.
44787/98, 25. September 2001, § 56, ECHR 2001-IX.
62 J. A. Frowein, in: Frowein/Peukert, EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 6.
63 C. Grabenwarter/K. Pabel, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 22, marginal number 9
(‚reasonable expectation of privacy‘-test).
64 A. Peters/T. Altwicker, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 26, marginal number 13.
65 A. Peters/T. Altwicker, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 26, marginal number 4 et seq.
66 J. A. Frowein, in: Frowein/Peukert, EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 8.
67 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.2 (a) (iii) (bb) and (cc).
68 Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 463 (A).
69 Swanepoel v Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit 1999 (4) SA 549, 553 (T), [1999] 3 All SA
285 (T).
70 Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590 (RA).
71 Goodman v Von Moltke 1938 CPD 153.
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death of a detainee73 need a justification.74 Moreover, a doctor encroaches this
right by telling his colleagues that his patient was suffering from AIDS without
having his permission75 and unauthorized publication of a photograph and story
about an unmarried mother who conceived a child by a well-known rugby
player76.
The German constitution guarantees that a person can create and maintain an
identity and must not be forced to reveal it.77 This includes the exceedingly
important right to informational self-determination, which ensures that every
person can freely determine if, to whom, when and how he/she would like to
share personal data to his/her environment.78 Another area is the self-
determination of one’s sexual life79, which gives a person the right to confess
his/her sexual orientation.80 It also includes the right to decide whether and how
one wants to have children81, get married82, know his/her parentage83 and to
choose about the question whether one wants to receive life-prolonging or life-
sustaining measures84.
In the European Convention on Human Rights, the name, the sexual preference
and sexual life, the right to knowledge of one’s parentage, the protection of one’s
reputation, the determination of paternity85, and the identification with a
gender86 are basic elements of privacy. Moreover, the lifestyle and the ethnic
identity of minorities are protected by the right to privacy.87 Thus, the European
73 La Grange v Schoeman 1980 (1) SA 885 (E).
74 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.2 (a) (iii) (bb).
75 Jansen van Vuuren NNO v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A).
76 National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262, 271 (A).
77 M. Martini, in: JA 2009, p. 841.
78 T. Bunger/M. Block, Der „Gläserne Mensch“, p. 7.
79 BVerfGE 47, 46 (73) [Sexualkundeunterricht].
80 BVerfGE 47, 46 (73) [Sexualkundeunterricht].
81 BVerfGE 88, 203 (254) [Schwangerschaftsabbruch II].
82 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) [Transsexuelle I].
83 BVerfGE 117, 202 (225 et seq.) [Vaterschaftsfeststellung].
84 M. Martini, in: JA 2009, p. 841.
85 See A. Peters/T. Altwicker, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 26, marginal number 9 et
seq.
86 See: J. Meyer-Ladewig, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 7 and J. Pätzold, in: Karpenstein/Mayer
(eds), EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 6 et seq.
87 A. Peters/T. Altwicker, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 26 marginal number 12; J. A.
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Court of Human Rights considers the lifestyle of caravan dwellers, such as the
Roma, if this is an integral part of ethnic identity, as protected by Section 8(1)
ECHR.88 Moreover, the right to informational self-determination is protected by
Section 8(1) ECHR.89 For this reason, the European Court of Human Rights and
the European Commission considers the collection and storage of data about a
person as an encroachment of section 8(1) EHCR.90 Other aspects are the
protection of a person’s reputation and the right to one’s own image.91 In
addition, section 8(1) ECHR protects the right to self-determination as a positive
obligation.92 This right protects the requirements which are necessary to lead a
private life.93 Hence, it is a state’s duty to ensure the protection of privacy with
all its legislative, jurisdictive and administrational organs.94 Moreover, it has to
establish the legal conditions which allow a subject to take action against
somebody who infringes a person’s right to privacy.95 The right of residence,
which provides a foreigner or a stateless person in a convention state the
opportunity to found and maintain a private life and the right to receive a living
wage, which is a prerequisite for leading a private life, are outflows of the right to
self-determination.96 Furthermore, the state has to fulfil numerous positive
obligations. Thus, authorities must provide access to the social security file if it
contains information about the childhood and biography of an applicant.97
88 Chapman v. the United Kingdom, no. 27238/95, 18. January 2001, ECHR, § 73; A. Peters/T.
Altwicker, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 26, marginal number 12.
89 Uzun v. Germany, no. 35623/05, 2. September 2010, ECHR, § 46.
90 J. A. Frowein, in: Frowein/Peukert, EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 5.
91 C. Grabenwarter/K. Pabel, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 22, marginal number 11.
92 A. Peters/T. Altwicker, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 26 marginal number 1.
93 F. Fischer, in: Fischer, Rheinischer Kommentar zur EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 20.
94 J. A. Frowein, in: Frowein/Peukert, EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 11 et seq.
95 J. A. Frowein, in: Frowein/Peukert, EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 11 with further
references.
96 F. Fischer, in: Fischer, Rheinischer Kommentar zur EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 20.
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C) Appropriation
Furthermore, section 14 of the South African constitution protects against
appropriation.98 Appropriation means in that context that a person‘s image or
likeness is used without their consent: for example, the unauthorized use of a
photograph for an advertisement.99 The German constitution100 and the
European Convention on Human Rights101 also gives a person the right to choose
which image of oneself is conveyed to the public. This protects the holder of the
fundamental right from falsifying, distorting or unsolicited representation by
others. In particular, this includes the right to one’s own image102, word103 and
name104, the right to reply105 and the right to re-socialization106. Furthermore,
governmental institutions are only allowed to collect or disclose information that
relates to the close personal sphere of a person’s life to the public, if this
infringement can be justified.107
98 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.2 (a) (iii) (dd).
99 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.2 (a) (iii) (dd).
100 M. Martini, in: JA 2009, p. 841.
101 See: J. Meyer-Ladewig, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 27 et seq.
102 BVerfGE 35, 202 (220) [Lebach].
103 BVerfGE 54, 148 (155) [Eppler].
104 BVerfG NJW 2009, p. 663 [Freie Vornamenswahl].
105 BVerfGE 63, 131 (142 et seq.) [Gegendarstellung].
106 BVerfGE 64, 261 (276 et seq.) [Hafturlaub].












A) Limitations of the right to privacy in the South African Constitution
Constitutional rights and freedoms are not absolute in the South African
constitution.108 A limitation of fundamental right, such as the right to privacy,
must however, be constitutionally justified in terms of the provisions of the
limitation clause in section 36(1) of the Constitution.109 Here, the applicant must
first demonstrate that the exercise of the right to privacy has been limited.110 In
a second stage, the respondent must establish that the infringement was
justifiable.111 Since this is mostly a question of proportionality, the details will be
explained in the next section.
B) Limitations of the rights to privacy in the German Constitution
I. Are infringements of the right to privacy in the German law not
justifiable?
The fundamental right to human dignity is absolute in the German Constitution
and no limitations are permitted at all.112 Thus, a proportionality test never takes
place.113 Even an infringement on one person’s dignity in order to protect the
108 I. Currie/J. de Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, p. 163.
109 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd, in
re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para 20.
110 S. Woolman/H. Botha, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 34.2 (a)
111 S. Woolman/H. Botha, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 34.2 (a)
112 BVerfGE 34, 238 (245) [Tonband]; BVerfGE 80, 367 (373) [Tagebuch]; E. Benda, in: NJW 2001,
p. 2147 et seq.; W. Höfling, in: M. Sachs (ed), Grundgesetz, Art. 1 GG, marginal number 11; P.
Kunig, in: von Münch/Kunig (eds), Vol. I, Art. 1 GG, marginal number 4; C. Enders, in:
Stern/Becker (eds), Grundrechte-Kommentar, Art. 1 GG, marginal number 21 et seq.; J. F. Lindner,
Theorie der Grundrechtsdogmatik, p. 186; H. D. Jarass, in: Jarass/Pieroth, Grundgesetz, Art. 1 GG,
marginal number 16; R. Zippelius, in: Dolzer/Kahl/Waldhoff/Graßhof (eds), Bonner Kommentar,
Art. 1 Abs. 1 u. 2 GG, marginal number 37 et seq.; A. Burghart, in: Leibholz/Rinck, GG, Vol. I, Art.
1 GG, marginal number 1.
113 A. K. Weilert, Grundlagen und Grenzen des Folterverbotes in verschiedenen Rechtskreisen, p. 404;












dignity of many other humans is not justifiable.114 Since the general right of
personality is deduced from the right to general freedom of action [Section 2(1)
GG] and the right to human dignity [Section 1(1) GG] it is questionable to what
extent infringements can be justified.
According to the prevailing opinion in the legal literature and jurisprudence,
infringements of the general right of personality are in most cases justifiable.115
This is explained by the fact that in the construction of the general right of
personality, the limitable section 2(1) GG plays the central role;116 human dignity
[Art. 1(1) GG] influences the general right of personality only subordinately117
and acts more as "programmatic guidance and policy interpretation"118. Such a
construction of the right is mainly derived from the wording of Section 2(1) GG,
which speaks of "free development of personality,” the essential component of
the protection of privacy.119 In this respect, human dignity is only affected by very
intimate encroachments. The state must refrain from these infringements of the
general right of personality, as they can’t be justified.
H. Sodan, in: Beck'scher Kompakt-Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Art. 1 GG, marginal number 27;
R. Will, in: Roggan, Mit Recht für Menschenwürde und Verfassungsstaat, p. 30.
114 M. Herdegen, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 1 GG, marginal number 73.
115 D. Murswiek, in: M. Sachs (ed), Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 103.
116So: H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Vol. 1, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal
number 68; H. D. Jarass, in: NJW 1989, p. 857; H. D. Jarass, in: Jarass/Pieroth, Grundgesetz, Art.
2 GG, marginal number 36; C. Degenhart, in: JuS 1992, p. 361 et seq.; P. Kunig, in: von
Münch/Kunig (eds), Vol. I, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 30; P. Kunig, in: Jura 1993, p. 603; H.
Sodan, in: Beck'scher Kompakt-Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 5; D.
Murswiek, in: M. Sachs (ed), Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 63; U. Di Fabio, in:
Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 128; H. Schneider, Die Güterabwägung des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts bei Grundrechtskonflikten, p. 88 et seq.; H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker
(eds), Grundrechte-Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 35 et seq.; C. Starck, in:
von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, GG I, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 15; W. Kahl, Die
Schutzergänzungsfunktion von Art. 2 Abs. 1 Grundgesetz, p. 6 et seq.; I. Härtel, in:
Grote/Härtel/Hain et al., Die Ordnung der Freiheit, p. 235; D. Lorenz, in:
Dolzer/Kahl/Waldhoff/Graßhof (ed), Bonner Kommentar, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 27;
of a different opinion: A. v. Arnauld, in: ZUM 1996, p. 287; H. Hofmann, in: Schmidt-
Bleibtreu/Hofmann/Hopfauf (eds), GG, Art. 1 GG, marginal number 58.
117 D. Murswiek, in: M. Sachs (ed), Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 63.
118 H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Vol. 1, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number
68; M. Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien, p. 281.













As laid down in section 2(1) GG (“einfacher Gesetzesvorbehalt”)120 a limitation
of the right to privacy can in the German law only be justified if it is based on a
statutory provision. The same applies to the European Convention on Human
Rights. According to section 8(2) ECHR, any infringement of the right to privacy
always requires a reservation of statutory powers.121 Since there are also states
with a common law system within the scope of the European Convention on
Human Rights, it doesn’t necessarily need to be a formal statue.122
Due to the fact that the requirement of a legal basis is an outflow of the principle
of proportionality, not only procedural but also substantive requirements are to
be subject to the requirement of legality.123 The holder of the fundamental right
must have the chance to access and recognize the consequences of a law which
encroaches his/her right to privacy.124 Moreover, it has to offer protection against
arbitrary intrusions.125 The requirements on certainty and degree of regulation
of this law depends mainly on its scope of application, on the type of
governmental action which is based on this law, and the number and status of the
120 BVerfGE 117, 202 (227) [Vaterschaftsfeststellung]; BVerfGE 120, 180 (199, 201) [Caroline von
Monaco III]; G. Beaucamp/J. Seifert, in: JA 2004, p. 542; F. Hufen, Staatsrecht II, § 11, marginal
number 23; H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker (Hrsg.), Grundrechte-Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal
number 93; U. Di Fabio, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 133; C. Starck,
in: von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, GG I, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 21; D. Lorenz, in:
Dolzer/Kahl/Waldhoff/Graßhof (Hrsg.), BK, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 402; M. Martini,
in: JA 2009, p. 844; W. v. Heintschel-Heinegg/N. Pallas, Grundrechte, marginal number 271; H. D.
Jarass, in: Jarass/Pieroth, Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 58; H. Sodan, in: Beck'scher
Kompakt-Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 12; H. Wilms, Staatsrecht II,
marginal number 327, 376; A. Streibel, Rassendiskriminierung als Eingriff in das allgemeine
Persönlichkeitsrecht, p. 141;
121 F. Fischer, in: Fischer, Rheinischer Kommentar zur EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 6.
Similar: A. Peters/T. Altwicker, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 25, marginal number 5.
122 R. Uerpmann-Wittzack, in: Ehlers (ed), Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, § 3,
marginal number 22; C. D. Classen, in: Manssen/Banaszak, Grundrechte im Umbruch, p. 62; W.
Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht, Vol. 4, marginal number 1250; J. Pätzold, in: Karpenstein/Mayer
(eds), EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, § 92; see as well: Leander v. Sweden, no. 9248/81, 26. March 1987,
ECHR, § 52 et seq.
123 J. Meyer-Ladewig, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 102; similar: J. A. Frowein, in: Vorb. zu Art.
8 - 11 EMRK, marginal number 2.
124 J. Pätzold, in: Karpenstein/Mayer (ed), EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal numbers 93, 95; J. Meyer-
Ladewig, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 102.
125 Rekvényi v. Hungary, no. 25390/94, 20. March 1999, ECHR, § 59; Uzun v. Germany, no. 35623/05,
2. September 2010, ECHR; J. Pätzold, in: Karpenstein/Mayer (eds), EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK,












persons who are concerned from that measure.126 Thus, the European
Convention on Human Rights sets stringent requirements of national laws which
allow for government measures, such as wiretapping:127 “The nature of the
offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the
categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the
duration of telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for examining, using
and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating
the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which recordings may or must
be erased or the tapes destroyed”.128 If a law doesn’t fulfil these requirements,
the infringement of privacy is not "prescribed by law"129 and thus the
interference is unlawful.130 These strict requirements must not only be fulfilled
for the collection of data, but also for storing and sharing them, since these
measures usually proceed in secret.131
126 J. Pätzold, in: Karpenstein/Mayer (ed), EMRK, Art. 8 EMRK, marginal number 94.
127 Khan v. the United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, 12. May 2000, ECHR, § 26.
128 Weber u. Saravia v. Germany, no. 54934/00, 29. June 2006, § 95, ECHR 2006-XI.
129 A. Peters/T. Altwicker, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, § 26, marginal number 19.
130 T. Schilling, Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz, § 247.











§ 4 PROPORTIONALITY WITH RESPECT TO LIMITATIONS OF
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A) Proportionality in the South African Constitution
According to 36(1) of the Constitution, the right to privacy may only be limited
in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including
the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the nature
and extent of the limitation, the relation between the limitation and its purpose
and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.132
Thus, the core of the constitutional justification for encroachments of section 14
is the proportionality test.133 The proportionality test is a central component in
the South African constitution and was significantly influenced by the case of S v
Makwanyane.134 Passage 104 of this case was originally a description for the
analysis which had to be undertaken in section 33 of the interim constitution135,
but it formed the basis of the text when the limitation clause – now section 36 –
was codified in the final constitution.136 According to section 36, there is no
absolute standard that can be laid down for determining reasonableness and
necessity of infringements in a democratic society; these circumstances have to
be balanced on a case by case basis.137 In this balancing process, the relevant
132 Parts of the South African legal literature criticize that this provision was inspired by the Canadian
Charter's limitation clause, the South African courts, however, don’t follow the stringent test laid
down by the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Oakes; see: S. Woolman/H. Botha, in: Constitutional
law of South Africa, Chapter 34.2 (b).
133 Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa & others, 1998 (7) BCLR
880 (CC), 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at para 30.
134 H. Mostert, The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform
of private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany, p. 352 et seq.; A. Barak,
Proportionality, p. 343.
135 I. Currie/J. de Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, p. 177.
136 National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6, 30 (CC),
1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at para 34.
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considerations will include the nature of the right that is limited, and its
importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality;
the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to
such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the
limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be
achieved through other means less damaging to the right in question.138 Thus, no
general answers can be given to the question of proportionality of an
encroachment of the right to privacy, but rather the individual case must be
analysed. Until now, there aren’t many cases which deal with the issue of
proportionality with respect to limitations of the right to privacy. However, the
understanding of the constitutional right to privacy can be drawn from a central
passage in Bernstein v Bester:
“The relevance of such an integrated approach to the interpretation of the right to
privacy is that this process of creating context cannot be confined to any one sphere,
and specifically not to an abstract individualistic approach. The truism that no right is
to be considered absolute, implies that from the outset of interpretation each right is
always already limited by every other right accruing to another citizen. In the context
of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his/her
family life, sexual preference and home environment, which is shielded from erosion
by conflicting rights of the community. This implies that community rights and the
rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby
shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member
of civil society. Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person
moves into communal relations and activities such as business and social interaction,
the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.”139
B) Proportionality in the German Constitution
The principle of proportionality is not explicitly expressed in the German
constitution.140 Its structural roots are mainly seen in the principle of the rule of
138 S v Makwanyane [1995] ZACC 3, 1995 (3) S.A. 391 at para 104.
139 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para 67.
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law and in the fundamental rights themselves.141 The principle of proportionality
“demands that an encroachment on fundamental rights has to serve a legitimate
purpose and be suitable, necessary, and appropriate as a means to this end”.142 A
law is appropriate when the gravity of the encroachment, in an overall
evaluation, is not disproportionate to the gravity of the reasons justifying it.143
I. Severity of limitation
The more severe the limitation of the right is, the stronger its justification must
be in law.144 Thus, the legislator has to regulate the aspects which are essential
for the realization of fundamental rights of the people by itself.145 However the
question, what is essential for the realization of fundamental rights, cannot be
answered in general; instead all circumstances of the case must be analysed.146
In its classical function, the general right of personality guarantees that a person
is protected from unlawful public interferences in the personality realisation.147
Here, the (1.) severity of governmental measures and (2.) the prevention of
encroachments on fundamental rights must be considered to determine if an
aspect is essential for the realization of fundamental rights. 148
141 BVerfGE 35, 382 (400) [Ausländerausweisung].
142 BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07 from 27.2.2008, marginal number 152; L. Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der
Verhältnismässigkeit, p. 2.
143 BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07 from 27.2.2008, marginal number 161.
144 This principle of materiality can be deduced from the rule of law [section 20(3) GG], in
conjunction with the principle of democracy [section 20(1) GG], see: BVerfGE 33, 125 (158)
[Facharzt]; BVerfGE 84, 212 (226) [Aussperrung]; P. Lerche, in: Merten/Papier, Handbuch der
Grundrechte in Deutschland und Europa, marginal number 62, marginal number 5 et seq.
145 A. Röthel, Normkonkretisierung im Privatrecht, p. 64; M. Mayer, Untermaß, Übermaß und
Wesensgehaltgarantie, p. 105.
146 J. Staupe, Parlamentsvorbehalt und Delegationsbefugnis, p. 239 et seq.
147 P. Kunig, in: von Münch/Kunig (eds), Volume I, Art. 2 GG, marginal note 40; U. Di Fabio, in:
Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal note 132; D. Grimm, in: Grimm/Schwerdtner, Schutz
der Persönlichkeit, p. 19; G. Wiese, in: Dauner-Lieb/Hommelhoff/Jacobs et al., Festschrift für Horst
Konzen zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, p. 989; for the right to informational self-determination: M.
Thiel, Die „Entgrenzung" der Gefahrenabwehr, p 224 et seq.
148 J. Staupe, Parlamentsvorbehalt und Delegationsbefugnis, p. 240; F. Reimer, in: Hoffmann-
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1. Infringements of the general right of personality are typically severe. This is a
consequence of the fact that the general right of personality protects the "closer
personal sphere of personal life"149 and the "preservation of the fundamental
conditions in which the individual can develop and maintain his/her
individuality."150 For measures carried out to access, observe or record
communications and other non-official information about a person (hereinafter
referred to as “government surveillance”), the intensity can be derived from the
fact that the collected information often allows the state to determine an
accurate conception of an individual’s personality.151 The other aspects of the
general right of personality protect very basic right-intensive sectors, such as the
right to know one’s parentage152, the right to select one’s name153 and the right
to free determination of one’s reproduction154. These are not about short-term,
one-time actions, but as a rule, live-bearing and individuality-forming decisions.
2. The second factor after the factual situation.155 Here, the preventive protection
of fundamental rights is of central importance when the individual appears to be
particularly at risk from interferences by the executive.156 In almost no areas of
the fundamental rights, humans are subjected to as high risks of interference
from the executive as in the general right of personality. This is particularly
evident in the highly relevant field of government surveillance. The executive
constantly needs information from the citizens. Without this data, proper
taxation would not be possible, the prosecution could not operate, benefits could
not be distributed correctly,157 statistics could not be created, subsidies could not
be paid not appropriately, the reliability of employees in sensitive areas (such as
149 See: U. Di Fabio, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 147; C. Hillgruber,
in: Umbach/Clemens (eds), Grundgesetz, Vol. I, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 45.
150 A. Peukert, Güterzuordnung als Rechtsprinzip, p. 81.
151 See the “mosaic theory“in § 2 B) II. 1. a).
152 BVerfGE 117, 202 [Vaterschaftsfeststellung].
153 BVerfGE 104, 373 (387 - 388) [Ausschluss von Doppelnamen].
154 BVerfGE 88, 203 (254) [Schwangerschaftsabbruch II].
155 J. Staupe, Parlamentsvorbehalt und Delegationsbefugnis, p. 240 with reference to BVerfGE 53,
30 (51) [Mülheim-Kärlich].
156 J. Staupe, Parlamentsvorbehalt und Delegationsbefugnis, p. 240.
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airports) could not be verified and asylum applications could not be handled. The
list could be extended indefinitely.
This high risk which is raised by the "collecting mania" of states is also shown by
the possibility of bank account scannings which was actually intended only for
exceptional cases.158 Since its introduction in 2005, the number of queries has
climbed from less than 9000 to more than 62000 scannings in 2011, with an
upward trend.159 With the increasing mechanization and medical progress, states
will have to expand their powers of intervention especially in law enforcement
to ensure effective crime control and prevention. Moreover, the financial
authorities are increasingly reliant on the establishment of comprehensive
reporting requirements in order to guarantee a proper taxation. Thus, in the
future, a rising amount of government surveillance can be expected.
Additionally, some areas of the general right of personality are compromised by
interferences of the executive.160 This is often the result from the fact that the
protection of the general right of personality is often linked to high financial
cost.161 As an example, the right to rehabilitation results in average costs of
32.000€ (about 416.000 Rand) for each prisoner in Federal Republic of Germany.
Since states have high debts and must cut costs, it is feared that individual
rehabilitation programs are neglected.162 Moreover, decisions that are made in
the field of the right to privacy often have an enormous political explosive
potential. This applies especially to the personality development elementary
field of identity formation and assertion (e.g. gay marriage, embryo research,
surrogate parenting, euthanasia, etc.). In this respect it is feared that the
authorities behave hesitantly because they are afraid of unpopular consequences
158 BVerfGE 118, 168 (197) [Kontostammdaten].
159 See http://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/datenschutz-staat-greift-mehr-und-mehr-konto-daten-ab-
1.1255978
160 BVerfGE 45, 187 (238 - 239) [Lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe]; BVerfGE 98, 169 (200)
[Arbeitspflicht].
161 Statistisches Bundesamt, Justiz auf einen Blick, 2011, p. 56; H. Entorf, in: APuZ 2010, p. 16.
162 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (30.06.2006): Sicherheit und Resozialisierung - Die Kassen
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or reject applications and pass on the responsibility to other government
agencies.
II. The free democratic constitutional order
The general right of personality is central for protecting the free democratic
constitutional order of the basic law. The free democratic constitutional order is a
"summary of all the fundamental and defining constitutional principles".163 The
repeated mention of this term in central parts of the German basic law shows its
great importance.164 A precise definition of the free democratic basic order does
not exist.165 However, the Bundesverfassungsgericht describes the concept as a
constitutional set-up which is based on the self-determination of the people, the
will of the majority, freedom and equality, excluding any violence and arbitrary
rule.166
In this respect, these are goals on which every governmental action has to be
based on,167 since that is the only way to ensure that the political order is always
prepared to defend a militant democracy.168 In this respect, the free development
of a human’s personality is a cornerstone of the free democratic constitutional
order.169 Thus, even a perfectly balanced right to vote is useless if it is not ensured
that a human is granted the opportunity for personal development. Only when
the people have the opportunity to develop an independent and self-responsible
opinion, strong democratic structures can emerge.170 Therefore the general right
of personality is of central importance since this protects "the actual identity of
the individual, and thus the (inner) being, which is the prerequisite self-
163 H. Maurer, Staatsrecht I, § 23, marginal note 5; similar: M. Deiters, in: Thiel, Wehrhafte
Demokratie, p. 293.
164 K. Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol. I, p. 556.
165 G. Dürig/H. H. Klein, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 18 GG, marginal number 55.
166 BVerfGE 2, 1 [SRP-Verbot]; see also: H. Butzer, in: Beck'scher Online-Kommentar GG, Art. 18
GG, marginal number 10.
167 K. Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Volume I, p. 573.
168 K. Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Volume I, p. 558.
169 BVerfGE 2, 1 [SRP-Verbot]; R. Klüber, Persönlichkeitsschutz und Kommerzialisierung, p. 35.
170 T. J. Geiger, Vorstudien zu einer Soziologie des Rechts, p. 129 et seq.; M. Rehbinder/T.
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determined action. Thus, the protection of the general right of personality is the
foundation for an active development of personality."171 Based on the central
importance and the enormous relevance of the free democratic constitutional
order, the general right of personality must be protected sufficiently. Hence, the
protection of the general right of personality must be given a high weight in the
proportionality test, so that only important reasons can allow limitations.
C) The proportionality test
Since the right to privacy can vary both in terms of type and consequence,
different criteria have to be set, to test if an infringement into the general right to
personality is appropriate or not. In this respect, it has to be distinguished
between government surveillance for infringements of privacy rights that protect
information (II.) and other limitations (I.).
I. The spheres theory
The so-called spheres theory was developed in the German jurisprudence to
categorize the proportionality test for infringements of the right to privacy.172
The aim of this model is to bring a certain structure into the difficult and complex
171 G. Britz, Kulturelle Rechte und Verfassung, p. 211.
172 H. Kube, in: Isensee/Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Germany, 3rd
edition, Vol. VII, § 148, marginal number 86. The spheres theroy is often critized in the legal
literature; see: M. Martini, in: JA 2009, p. 844; H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker (eds), Grundrechte-
Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 103; G. Manssen, Staatsrecht II, marginal number 244;
H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Vol. 1, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number
88; P. Kunig, in: von Münch/Kunig (eds), Vol. I, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 41; A. Podlech, in:
Denninger/Hoffmann-Riem/Schneider/Stein (eds), AK-GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 36
et seq. Here, the lack of contouring and the resulting relativity of the spheres are put forward as the
main points of criticism (U. Di Fabio, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number
157 et seq.; K. Rogall, Informationseingriff und Gesetzesvorbehalt im Strafprozess, p. 32 et seq.;
H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Vol. 1, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number
88). In this respect, one could only speak of "gradual shades", but not of "separate districts": (P.
Petersen, Grenzen des Verrechtlichungsgebotes im Datenschutz, p. 11; C. Starck, in:
von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, GG I, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 16; C. Hillgruber, in:
Umbach/Clemens (eds), Grundgesetz, Vol. I, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 87; A. Podlech,
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area of appropriateness of infringements into the general right of personality in
order to gain legal certainty for the people and the state.173 Therefore, three
spheres are to be differentiated. In the above cited passage of the case Bernstein
v Bester the South African Constitutional Court seems to adopt the spheres
theory. In the following section the content of the spheres theory and question to
what extend the spheres theory can be adapted into the South African law has to
be analysed.
1. The intimate sphere
a) The scope of protection
In Bernstein v Bester, the Constitutional Court assumes that a certain area of the
right to privacy can’t be limited (“In the context of privacy this would mean that
it is only the inner sanctum of a person […] which is shielded from erosion by
conflicting rights of the community”). This absolute protected area of privacy is
called the intimate sphere.174 The Constitutional Court seems to narrowly define
the intimate sphere. In Case v Minister of Safety and Security in which section 2(1)
of the Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act was repealed, Judge Didcott
J has argued for an absolutely protected sphere in the context of pornography,
since it is according to his opinion only a person’s business what erotic material
he/she may choose to keep within the privacy of his/her home, and only for a
personal use there. This was “certainly not” the business of society or the state.
Thus, any ban imposed on the possession of such material for that solitary
purpose invaded the right to privacy.175 However, this statement was qualified by
173 U. Di Fabio, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 157 et seq.; K. Rogall,
Informationseingriff und Gesetzesvorbehalt im Strafprozess, p. 32 et seq..; H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier
(ed), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Vol. 1, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 88.
174 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para 77.
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some of the other judges who were concerned about such issues as child
pornography.176
The Constitutional Court does not define the scope of privacy exhaustively, but
names some examples ("his/her family life, sexual preference and home
environment"). The broad wording of these areas causes legal uncertainty. Thus,
it has to be questioned whether a comparison to the German legal situation can
define this sphere more precisely. Like in the South African constitutional law,
the intimate sphere in the Grundgesetz is an area of privacy that is protected
absolutely.177 According to the German Bundesverfassungsgericht the intimate
sphere is characterized by its highly personal content.178 It is only described
negatively:179 An infringement that is based on interaction with other humans is
principally not absolute.180 Processes that take place in communication with
others can however be included in the intimate sphere. This depends on whether
the social reference is strong enough.181 The Bundesverfassungsgericht does not
precisely define the conditions under which a case is so personal or the social
reference is so strong that it must be absolutely protected; this depends on the
particular case.182 Up to now, there has not been a single case in which the
Bundesverfassungsgericht has considered the intimate sphere of the general right
176 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.2 (a) (iii) (cc) with refer to
Judge’s Langa’s statement at para 99 and Judge’s Madala’s statement at para 107.
177 BVerfGE 27, 1 (6) [Mikrozensus]; BVerfGE 27, 344 (350) [Ehescheidungsakten]; BVerfGE 80,
367 (373) [Tagebuch]; BVerfGE 90, 263 (270) [Ehelichkeitsanfechtung]; K. Stern, Das Staatsrecht
der Bundesrepublik Germany, Vol. IV/1, p. 206 et seq.; H. Sodan, in: Beck'scher Kompakt-
Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Art. 19 GG, marginal number 10; H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker
(eds), Grundrechte-Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 110; K. H. Gössel, in:
Meyer/Geppert/Dehnicke, Gedächtnisschrift für Karlheinz Meyer, p. 140; H.-D. Horn, in:
Stern/Becker (eds), Grundrechte-Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 110; B. Remmert, in:
Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 19 Abs. 2 GG, marginal number 36 et seq.; M. Middendorf, in: Jura 2003,
p. 232 et seq.; P. M. Huber, in: von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, GG I, Art. 19 GG, marginal number
175; H. D. Jarass, in: Jarass/Pieroth, Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 62; A. Streibel,
Rassendiskriminierung als Eingriff in das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht, p. 141; W. v. Heintschel-
Heinegg/N. Pallas, Grundrechte, marginal number 273.
178 BVerfGE 34, 238 (248) [Tonband]; BVerfGE 80, 367 (374) [Tagebuch]; BVerfGE 109, 279 (313
et seq.) [Großer Lauschangriff]; BVerfGE 120, 224 (239) [Geschwisterbeischlaf].
179 M. Desoi/A. Knierim, in: DÖV 2011, p. 399; critical: H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker (eds),
Grundrechte-Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 104 et seq.
180 BVerfGE 27, 1 (7) [Mikrozensus].
181 BVerfGE 6, 389 (433) [Homosexualität I].
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of personality as violated.183 However, it mentioned in obiter dicta that it
considers pregnancy184 and sexual identity185 as parts of the intimate sphere.
Since this describes only two areas of the innermost sphere of human life, a
generally accepted definition of the intimate sphere cannot be deduced.
On the contrary, there are a number of cases in which the
Bundesverfassungsgericht doesn’t consider the intimate sphere as violated. For
instance, the free use of drugs is not covered by the intimate sphere.186 Moreover,
records of divorce proceedings are not part of the inviolable area of private life.187
The same applies to medical records, including the statements about the medical
history, diagnostic and therapeutic measures.188 Furthermore, secretly recorded
private tape recordings which are taken for criminal investigation procedures are
also not covered by the intimate sphere, if it is merely a business conversation in
which no personal matters are discussed.189 In addition, the removal of body cells
and the subsequent molecular genetic analysis in order to detect a DNA
identification pattern is not to part of the intimate sphere.190 Diary-like records
are also excluded from absolute protection.191
b) Can the intimate sphere be defined?
Hence, a precise definition of the intimate sphere has yet to be formulated in the
German and South African law.192 Thus, it has to be examined whether it is
possible to describe the intimate sphere entirely. If this was the case, there would
be an absolute legal certainty. The state would know which infringements are not
183 B. Pieroth/B. Schlink, Grundrechte, marginal number 396; M. Desoi/A. Knierim, in: DÖV 2011,
p. 398 (400); C. Starck, in: von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, GG I, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal numbers
50 and 88.
184 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) [Schwangerschaftsabbruch I].
185 BVerfGE 116, 243 (264) [Transsexuelle IV].
186 BVerfGE 90, 145 (171) [Cannabis].
187 BVerfGE 27, 344 (351) [Ehescheidungsakten.
188 BVerfGE 32, 373 (379) [Ärztliche Schweigepflicht].
189 BVerfGE 34, 238 (248) [Tonband].
190 BVerfGE 103, 21 (31) [Genetischer Fingerabdruck I].
191 BVerfGE 80, 367 (373) [Tagebuch].
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allowed, because they cannot (under no circumstances) be justified. Moreover,
the holder of the fundamental right would be able to determinate immediately
which interventions he/she has to tolerate and which not. This would not only
help to prevent citizens from developing distrust against certain authorities,
since the state has clearly defined limits. Moreover, this would help to reduce the
case loads of courts.
However, the term “intimate sphere” is subject to constant social change. Hence,
the core area of a person's private life was protected long before the South Africa
and Germany have established a constitutional right to privacy. Already the
Roman law protected a person against indiscretions and breach of secrecy, which
constituted a piece of inner cultural history of the Roman people.193
Furthermore, the U.S. Constitution contains in its fourth amendment a "right to
be let alone".194 However, the bourgeoisie in the continental European and Anglo-
Saxon countries at the end of the 19th Century didn’t feel threatened by state’s
interferences into the core area of their private life, but rather by their
neighbours and slowly developing yellow press.195
Only when new communications technologies were invented people feared the
violation of their right to privacy in their homes ("my home is my castle"), since
that caused new potential dangers: For instance, phones could be tapped and due
to the improvement of cameras, intimate insights of a person's private life could
be gained.196 This was increasingly seen as a threat because an intact family was
necessary for a successful career in the middle of the 19th century; regardless of
what was hidden behind the facade of the supposed idyll.197 Furthermore, it
became easier to spread intimate information (for example via radio) about
respected citizens, which was able to cause “mental pain and distress, far greater
193 R. v. Jhering, Rechtsschutz gegen injuriöse Rechtsverletzungen, p. 157; A. Heldrich, in:
Heinrichs/Heldrich/Schlechtriem et al., Recht im Spannungsfeld von Theorie und Praxis, p. 332;
O. Mallmann, Zielfunktionen des Datenschutzes, p. 16.
194 Y. S. Lee/D. H. Rosenbloom, A reasonable public servant, p. 113.
195 W. Schmitt Glaeser, in: Isensee/Kirchhof (Hrsg.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, 2. Auflage, vol VII, § 129, marginal number 11; O. Mallmann, Zielfunktionen des
Datenschutzes, p. 20 with further references
196 O. Mallmann, Zielfunktionen des Datenschutzes, p. 20 with further references
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than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury"198. Moreover, a further danger
developed gradually: Due to the increasing commercialization of private data
people saw themselves as defenceless information objects.199 Thus, credit
investigation companies were developed, which collected data of citizens and
pictures of celebrities were used for press products or advertisements without
permission.200
Looking at this historical development, it must be noted that a precise definition
of intimate sphere can’t be found, since the right to privacy and thus, what is
regarded to be the core of a person’s private life is subject to permanent
transition. This applies especially for the sexual morality, which has a high
influence in determining the intimate sphere.201 Here, this co stant change can
for instance be seen on the improved position of homosexual people in the
society. The jurisprudence must conform thereto. A rigid definition of the
intimate sphere wouldn’t have the ability to keep pace with the changes in society
and also ward off future threats. Thus, it is very likely that in 50 years sexuality
is still protected by the right to privacy. However, the question where the
absolutely protected area of sexual life begins could be answered completely
differently, since that depends on the particular morality, which is subject to a
permanent process of change.
In addition, the contrast between the issues that citizens demand and their actual
actions is growing. On the one hand, there is a global development that people
fight increasingly for a stronger protection of the right to informational self-
determination.202 On the other hand, there is a growing tendency for self-display.
198 S. Warren/L. Brandeis, in: Harvard Law Review 1890, p. 196.
199 O. Mallmann, Zielfunktionen des Datenschutzes, p. 22 et seq.
200 O. Mallmann, Zielfunktionen des Datenschutzes, p. 22 et seq. with further references.
201 See National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6, 30 (CC),
1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at para 32: “Privacy recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of
private intimacy and autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships
without interference from the outside community. The way in which we give expression to our
sexuality is at the core of this area of private intimacy.”
202 W. Schmitt Glaeser, in: Isensee/Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik
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203 A shame barrier is in some cases barely recognizable.204 Whereas in the 19th
Century it was very important to express a harmonious family picture, today
family members fight each other publicly. What some commentators called thirty
years ago as "an unprecedented journalistic affinity for exhibitionism"205,
because of the production of talk shows, countless memoirs and autobiographies
has increased by a multiple in the last few years. Until recently, it was only
possible for a small group of people to carry their private life to the public (talk
show guests, authors of autobiographies, etc.). In the course of progression of
technology, everyone now has the ability to share his/her intimacies through
social networks or blogs. The success of these portals shows that people make
frequent use of this. In this respect, the scope of the intimate sphere of the
affected persons is increasingly narrowed as this area can only be touched if
he/she has a legitimate expectation of privacy.206
c) Theoretical derivation of an inviolable sphere
This intimate sphere is an exception from the principle of proportionality. Thus,
not even fundamental interests (for example, the protection of the public against
terrorism) can justify infringements of the private sphere. However, in South
African law there is no basis in the constitution for an absolute sphere for any
right:
“I reiterate that the rights contained in the Bill of Rights are not absolute. Rights have
to be exercised with due regard and respect for the rights of others. Organised society
can only operate on the basis of rights being exercised harmoniously with the rights of
others. Of course, the rights exercised by an individual may come into conflict with the
203 W. Berg, in: JöR N.F. 1984, p. 67.
204 W. Schmitt Glaeser, in: Isensee/Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, 2nd edition, Volume VII, § 129, marginal note 13 - 14.
205 W. Berg, in: JöR N.F. 1984, p. 67.
206 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para 75. Here, there is no difference to the German
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rights exercised by another, and where rights come into conflict, a balancing process
is required”.207
The South African Constitutional Court does not explain in Bernstein v Bester why
any part of the right to privacy is absolutely protected. It seems to have borrowed
this concept form German law which does acknowledge an intimate sphere.208
Here, the absolute intimate sphere is explained by its proximity to human dignity,
which in German law, is not infrangible. This absoluteness is not only the result
of the wording "inviolable" in section 1(1) GG.209 Rather, it shows the absolute
will that the terrible atrocities which happened during the Nazi regime must
never be repeated. 210 In contrast to the Weimar constitution, which preceded the
Nazi era and in which the protection of human dignity was only mentioned
parenthetically in section 151(1) in connection with the order of economic life,211
the dignity is the "supreme constitutional value" in the Grundgesetz.212 The
central position of human dignity in the Grundgesetz is a "response to a
totalitarian government system"213 and is meant to protect the foundations of a
civilized society.214 Thus, it constitutes a clear rejection of the persecution of
minorities, racism, "euthanasia", human experiments, inhuman punishments,
complete deprivation and humiliation.215 Another "historical disaster"216 is to be
forestalled at all costs. Whereas in the Nazi era, the principle "you are nothing,
207 See De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2002 (6) SA 370
(CC), 2002 (12) BCLR 1285 (CC) at para 89
208 See: Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para 77 et seq.
209 F. Hufen, in: JuS 2010, p. 9; M. Herdegen, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 1 GG, marginal number 73;
H. D. Jarass, in: Jarass/Pieroth, Grundgesetz, Art. 1 GG, § 16.
210 C. D. Classen, in: DÖV 2009, p. 693; J. F. Lindner, Theorie der Grundrechtsdogmatik, p. 186; W.
Härle, Menschsein in Beziehungen, p. 379; C. Walter, in: Bahr/Heinig, Menschenwürde in der
säkularen Verfassungsordnung, p. 127; H. John, Die genetische Veränderung des Erbgutes
menschlicher Embryonen, p. 101; J. Neuner, Grundrechte und Privatrecht aus rechtsvergleichender
Sicht, p. 168.
211 S. Hein, Grundrechte in der Weimarer Reichsverfassung, p. 14; H. Brenneisen, in: Brenneisen,
Rechtsprechung des BVerfG, p. 12 (Footnote 6).
212 BVerfGE 109, 279 (311) [Großer Lauschangriff]; similar: A. Burghart, in: Leibholz/Rinck, GG,
Vol. I, Art. 1 GG, marginal note 2.
213 A. Reich, in: Magdeburger Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Art. 1 GG, p. 74 with reference to
BVerfGE 5, 85 (204 – 205) [KPD-Verbot]; similar: C. Enders, in: Stern/Becker (ed), Grundrechte-
Kommentar, Art. 1 GG, marginal note 5; P. Unruh, Der Verfassungsbegriff des Grundgesetzes, p.
354; H. Hofmann, in: Hofmann, Verfassungsrechtliche Perspektiven, p. 105,
214 C. Starck, in: von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, GG I, Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 10.
215 M. Antoni, in: Hömig (ed), Grundgesetz, Art. 1 GG, marginal number 5.
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your people are everything"217 was applied, the draft of the Constitutional
Convention contained in Article A the diametrically opposed formulation "The
state is for the sake of citizens, not the citizens for the sake of state." 218 In this
respect, the state fulfils only "a subservient, instrumental function".219 Thus, the
invulnerable human dignity is seen in the German Constitution as the "root of all
fundamental rights"220 and encompasses the "most important fundamental
constitutional decision".221
In the South African law, an intimate sphere can’t be explained with reference to
either the text of section 14 itself or the text of section 36 of the constitution. An
absolute protected intimate sphere is against the express wording of the
limitation clause which allows to limit all basic rights, even the human dignity.
Thus, adapting the German jurisdiction is in this case not only wrong, but also
dangerous, since this case can be taken as a basis for another case. Constitutional
jurisprudence and the wording of the constitution are then drifting further and
further apart from each other. Moreover, it has to be questioned, how the South
African Constitution can ever be seen as a structural unit when the Constitutional
Court just overtakes the jurisprudence from other countries blindly without even
trying to justify why this result applies also for the South African Constitution.
Furthermore, it can’t be argued that this jurisprudence has the advantage that it
provides more privacy for the holders of this fundamental right. Thus, a victim of
a crime has a precarious legal position, when the authorities don’t take certain
criminal investigations in order not to violate the intimate sphere of an alleged
offender, even though a balancing under proportionality test would allow these
measures. However, it can be argued that it is to be welcomed that the South
African Constitutional Court has created an area in which encroachments are
never tolerated since the mere existence of this possibility raises the awareness
217 See: G. Radbruch/W. Hassemer/A. Kaufmann, Rechtsphilosophie III, p. 110; C. Hilger,
Rechtsstaatsbegriffe im Dritten Reich, p. 141 – 142.
218 See: R. Schick/H.-J. Stelzl/K. G. Wernicke, Der Parlamentarische Rat, p. 217; H. Brenneisen, in:
Brenneisen, Rechtsprechung des BVerfG, p. 9; similar: H. Maurer, Staatsrecht I, marginal number
4.
219 H.-H. v. Arnim, Staatslehre der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 129.
220 BVerfGE 93, 266 (293) [„Soldaten sind Mörder“]; see also: P. Häberle, in: Isensee/Kirchhof,
Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol. II, § 20, marginal number 58.
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for state organizations in dealing with measures, which deeply affect the right to
privacy.
d) Criticism
The South African Constitutional court points out that “privacy is acknowledged
in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal relations and
activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space
shrinks accordingly”.222 The German Bundesverfassungsgericht uses a similar
criterion.223 However, it has to be questioned if that is a suitable reason for
differentiation.224 This becomes particularly evident in the example of sexuality.
Here, the irony exists that sexuality requires the contact with the sexual partner,
which makes it – according to this definition – no longer a part of the intimate
sphere, since the holder of the fundamental right leaves his/her inner sanctum
and connects to somebody else.225 But sexuality especially belongs traditionally
to the most intimate human relationships.226
Moreover, the argument used by Judge Langa and Judge Madala that the intimate
sphere can’t protect the possession of pornography because otherwise child
pornography would be absolutely protected must be structurally criticized. It
must be asked whether the possession of pornography concerns the inner
sanctum of the right of privacy. If that was the case (which may be doubted), this
would inevitably lead to an absolute protection of this right. The intimate sphere
must be explained by the proximity to the human dignity and not by to possibility
for justification of encroachments. Thus, Jude’s Langa’s and Judge’s Madala’s
argumentation is not only structurally wrong since it mixes up the question
whether an act belongs to the inner circle of life with the question of its
222 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para 67.
223 „Sozialbezug“, see: BVerfGE 6, 389 (433) [Homosexualität I].
224 P. Kunig, in: Jura 1993, p. 602.
225 E. Benda, in: Leibholz/Faller/Geiger, Menschenwürde und freiheitliche Rechtsordnung, p. 30; A.
Podlech, in: Denninger/Hoffmann-Riem/Schneider/Stein (ed), AK-GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, § 38.
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possibilities of limitations, but also dangerous because this argumentation
enables to declare the most intimate actions as justifiable. A protection of the
intimate sphere would in this case in fact no longer exist.
2. Private sphere and social sphere?
In the case of Bernstein v Bester, the Constitutional Court listed only the intimate
sphere as a category in the proportionality test for infringements of the right to
privacy. In contrast to the German jurisprudence, no other categories are
mentioned. Here, the German jurisprudence differentiates between the private
sphere as a second category and the social sphere as a third. To find out if these
categories are also compulsory for the South African law, these spheres have
firstly to be defined (1., 2.) and secondly it must be examined if this result has to
be transferred into the South African Constitutional law (3.).
a) The private sphere
The German jurisprudence sees around the restrictively handled area of intimate
sphere the principally limitable227 private sphere.228 However, the factor of
proportionality forces the authorities to overcome high barriers to justify
infringements of the private sphere.229 A justification is usually only possible if
important interests of the common welfare must be protected.230 Although a
precise definition for the private sphere is also non-existent, sharper contours
can be drawn. The Bundesverfassungsgericht divides the private sphere into a
thematic and spatial component. The thematic element encompasses "matters
that are typically classified for its content as 'private', because a public discussion
or display is considered unseemly, the disclosure is perceived as embarrassing or
227 C. Degenhart, in: JuS 1992, p. 363.
228 U. Di Fabio, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 159.
229 H.-D. Horn, in: Stern/Becker (eds), Grundrechte-Kommentar, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 103.
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triggers adverse reactions in the surrounding world,231 as for example disputes
with oneself in diaries232, confidential communication between spouses233, the
area of sexuality234, socially deviant behaviour235 or illnesses236.
More important than thematic protection, however, is the spatial component,237
which covers a space "where individuals come to relax or can let go."238 This area
is not only to be understood strictly in the literal sense of physically-local, but it
also includes the mental and spiritual inner life - such as the thoughts and
feelings - of human beings.239 The private sphere also provides an opportunity
for a person to behave in a way that is not intended for the public, because the
observation by outsiders would be embarrassing or harmful for the person in
question. Thus, the private sphere creates a room in which a person has the
opportunity to be free from public observation and doesn’t need to control
himself or herself.240 The Bundesverfassungsgericht understands the existence of
a protected private sphere as a prerequisite for the preservation of liberty rights.
“If such areas were no longer available, a person could be mentally overwhelmed, because
he/she would incessantly have to be careful how he/she affects others and if he/she behaves
appropriately. He/she would lack phases of aloneness and compensation, which are
necessary for the development of personality, and without which he/she would be
significantly impaired.”241
The legal literature has demanded early a sheltered area offering privacy. As early
as 1956 it was mentioned that it is “a necessary condition of personal
development that a man has the ability to talk without inhibition or obligation
and without being set to each word and not to be sounded out and spied on in his
231 BVerfGE 101, 361 (382) [Caroline von Monaco II].
232 BVerfGE 80, 367 [Tagebuch].
233 BVerfGE 27, 344 [Ehescheidungsakten].
234 BVerfGE 47, 46 [Sexualkundeunterricht]; BVerfGE 49, 286 [Transsexuelle I].
235 BVerfGE 44, 353 [Durchsuchung einer Drogenberatungsstelle].
236 BVerfGE 32, 373 [Ärztliche Schweigepflicht].
237 K. Stern, in: Bröhmer (ed), Internationale Gemeinschaft und Menschenrechte, p. 1264.
238 BVerfGE 101, 361 (382 et seq.) [Caroline von Monaco II] with reference to BVerfGE 27, 1 (6)
[Mikrozensus].
239 K. Stern, in: Bröhmer (ed), Internationale Gemeinschaft und Menschenrechte, p. 1264.
240 BVerfGE 101, 361 (383) [Caroline von Monaco II].
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private life." Thus, celebrities also have the right to the protection of their privacy,
even if they tend to share every detail of their lives with the public. 242
b) The social sphere
The least protected area is the social sphere.243 Nevertheless, the importance of
this field gains relevance with the growth of so-called "review portals" for e.g.,
professors, teachers, doctors, lawyers, craftsmen or judges.244 The social sphere
encompasses those life activities which can easily be perceived by others without
the affected person turning actively towards the public.245 Thus, the social sphere
is an area in which the individual acts in public, but does not specifically address
the public.246 It protects the personality of a human in his/her relation to the
surrounding world, his/her public, professional and economic appearance, as for
example at work, in traffic, in a political or commercial247 convention, or even
while shopping, in pubs and on the beach.248
The protection of privacy in the social sphere is much lower than the intimate or
private sphere.249 Intrusions of this area are generally allowed, when no false
factual assertion, defamatory comment, nor abusive criticism is committed.250
Thus, journalists are generally permitted to report about the social sphere of a
person’s life, if this has no serious impact on his/her general right of personality,
so for example, if a stigma, social rejection, exclusion or pillory effect must be
feared.251 The Bundesverfassungsgericht did not use the term “social sphere” until
242 K. Stern, in: Bröhmer (ed), Internationale Gemeinschaft und Menschenrechte, p. 1265; A.
Heldrich, in: Heinrichs/Heldrich/Schlechtriem et al., Recht im Spannungsfeld von Theorie und
Praxis, p. 332; BVerfGE 101, 361 (383) [Caroline von Monaco II].
243 U. Di Fabio, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 160.
244 T. Feldmann, in: Heidrich/Forgó/Feldmann, Heise Online-Recht, B II, marginal number 105.
245 U. Branahl, Medienrecht, p. 139.
246 C. Ohrmann, Der Schutz der Persönlichkeit in Online-Medien, p. 83.
247 N. Fechner, Wahrung der Intimität?, p. 33.
248 C. Ohrmann, Der Schutz der Persönlichkeit in Online-Medien, p. 83.
249 BGH NJW 2005, 592.
250 R. Scholz/Konrad Karlheinz, in: AöR 1998, p. 64.
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recently,252 but the greatly prevailing opinion in the legal literature has always
assumed that this area must exist. It was referred to as a "logical consequence of
the development of the intimate and the private sphere" that there has to be a
"non-protected social sphere".253 However, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has
used the term “social sphere” in recent cases. For example, it has ruled that the
expression of true facts, especially when they come from the area of the social
sphere, must be generally accepted.254
The concept of the social sphere is controversial. Parts of the legal literature
assume that this sphere is redundant, since the transition between "very private
issues and issues that are not private anymore" is so smooth that it is impossible
to form two areas.255 In addition, it is criticised that it can’t be tolerated that
persons who suffer a reputational damage in public are largely without legal
protection, although this defamation can even lead to one’s suicide, precisely
because it took place in public.256 Furthermore, it is criticised that it is
inconsistent that the Bundesverfassungsgericht continuously strengthens the
protection of the right to informational self-determination on the one hand, but
on the other it leaves a completely unprotected sphere.257
c) Application in the South African Constitutional law?
The Constitutional Court paraphrases in the above cited paragraph of the case
Bernstein v Bester the basics of the private sphere, even if it does not name it
expressly. Since the right to privacy can’t be absolute in the majority of cases the
private sphere is logically compulsory. Thus, a private sphere must also consist
in the South African Constitutional law. However, it is questionable whether the
252 See: A. v. Arnauld, in: ZUM 1996, p. 289.
253 K. Vogelgesang, Grundrecht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung?, p. 44 et seq.
254 See BVerfG NJW 2010, 1587 (1588).
255 R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, p. 329.
256H. Kube, in: Isensee/Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Germany, 3rd
edition, Vol. VII, § 148, marginal number 87.
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social sphere, which is generally open for interventions, is also necessary for
South African law.
In parts of the German legal literature the social sphere is considered redundant.
Since the transition between "most private aspects and those issues which are
not private at all" was so smooth that it was impossible to form two classes, the
intensity of an infringement and the degree of privacy must be differentiated for
each single case (without categorizations) in order to achieve a just result.258 In
this respect one cannot speak about a “spheres theory”, but rather about a "core
thesis", in which it only matters if an encroachment is so intense that it can’t be
justified because it affects the absolutely protected core area or if it is accessible
to the proportionality test.259 In addition, there is criticism that it is unacceptable
that people with damage to reputation, which - precisely because they take place
just in public - even lead to suicide, are more or less defenceless.260
The fact that the social sphere is not or only slightly protected leads to
dogmatically unacceptable results. This construction sends not only the wrong
signal to the population, but it is also a gateway for the erosion of the right to
human dignity, because a central legal interest that is connected to human dignity
is (mostly) unprotected. These negative consequences can be impeded because
of the flexibility of the proportionality. When the intimate sphere is not affected
- and thus an intervention can be justified – it must be drawn to the principles of
the proportionality test: A strong intervention requires a substantial
justification, a weak encroachment can be accordingly justified more easily.
Thus, a third sphere, which is principally open for interventions, is not necessary.
Moreover, the proportionality test that is laid down in section 36 of the 1996
constitution gives a better instrument to rate the specific case. This allows that
all objective and subjective elements can be considered in a step-less weighing of
interests. This interpretation is also consistent with the above-cited passage of S
258 R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, p. 329.
259 A. v. Arnauld, in: ZUM 1996, p. 289.
260H. Kube, in: Isensee/Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
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v Makwanyane, in which the Constitutional Court has pointed that there is no
absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and
necessity. Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to
particular circumstances can only be done on a case by case basis.
3. Individual cases
a) Cases that South African judges have to consider
Since the South African constitution is relatively new there are except from
Bernstein v Bester there are not many important individual cases in this area that
have to be considered when making a new judgment. In the case Bernstein v.
Bester the Constitutional Court has ruled that sections 417(3) and 418(2) of the
Companies Act, which compel production of private possessions or private
communications during the winding-up of a company, are consitutional.261 The
court stated that “the right against seizure must therefore be interpreted in the
light of the general right to personal privacy. […] The public’s interest in
ascertaining the truth surrounding the collapse of the company, the liquidator’s
interest in a speedy and effective liquidation of the company and the creditors’
and contributors’ financial interests in the recovery of company assets must be
weighed against this, peripheral, infringement of the right not to be subjected to
seizure of private possessions.”262
b) Cases that German judges have to consider
Whereas the German Bundesverfassungsgericht sees the constitution as a unit
and usually works out an “integrated system” in which new cases can fit (like the
261 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.5 (b).
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spheres theory),263 the European Court of Human Rights concentrates more on
the actual case which it has to decide. Since these cases have to be considered by
German judges264 they have to be analysed.
According to that, the right to self-determination pertaining to one‘s body
normally allows for medical procedures - even if they have no medical necessity
- to gather evidence for penal proceedings.265 Thus, the taking of blood or saliva
samples against a suspect’s will in order to investigate an offence regularly
outweighs the suspect’s right to personality in the proportionality test.266 The
European Court of Human Rights points out, however, that “any recourse to a
forcible medical intervention in order to obtain evidence of a crime must be
convincingly justified on the facts of a particular case and the manner in which a
person is subjected to a forcible medical procedure must not exceed the
minimum level of severity prescribed by the Court’s case-law under Section 3 of
the Convention”.267
Since these medical procedures are drastic measures, the European Court on
Human Rights emphasises that all circumstances have to be taken into account.
268 In this respect it must be determined whether the treatment caused
substantial mental or physical suffering.269 Thus, it is important if a doctor has
arranged and executed the medical intervention and whether the person was
under constant medical supervision.270 In addition, the severity of the offense
must be appropriately taken into account and the authorities have to state that
they have considered alternative methods of investigation.271 Furthermore, the
frequency of this regulatory action is set in the balance. Thus, it may constitute a
263 Similar: J. Detjen, Die Werteordnung des Grundgesetzes, p. 35 et seq.
264 BVerfGE 111, 307 (317 – 318) [EGMR-Entscheidungen];
265 Juhnke v. Turkey, no. 52414/99, 13. May 2008, ECHR, § 72.
266 See: Jalloh v. Germany, no. 54810/00, 11. July 2006, ECHR, § 70; also: X v. the Netherlands, no.
8239/78, Commission decision of 4 December 1978, Decisions and Reports (DR) 16, pp. 187-89;
Schmidt v. Germany (dec.), no. 32352/02, 5 January 2006, ECHR.
267 Juhnke v. Turkey, no. 52515/99, 13. May 2008, ECHR, § 72.
268 Jalloh v. Germany, no. 54810/00 11. July 2006, ECHR, § 71.
269 Nevmertzhitsky v. Ukraine, no. 54825/00, 05. April 2005, ECHR, § 98.
270 Jalloh v. Germany, no. 54810/00, 11. July 2006, ECHR, § 73.










Proportionality with respect to limitations of the right to privacy
46
disproportionate interference with the right to private life, when a person has to
undergo several tests in a short time.272
The court points out that it has to be primarily the responsibility of States to
assess “the risk and the likely incidence of abuse if the general prohibition on
assisted suicides were relaxed or if exceptions were to be created”.273 Moreover,
“it does not appear to be arbitrary to the Court for the law to reflect the
importance of the right to life, by prohibiting assisted suicide while providing for
a system of enforcement and adjudication which allows due regard to be given in
each particular case to the public interest in bringing a prosecution, as well as to
the fair and proper requirements of retribution and deterrence.”274
Infringements on sensitive areas of the right of privacy can only be justified by
strong grounds.275 Thus, the margin of appreciation tends to “be narrower where
the right at stake is crucial to the individual’s effective enjoyment of intimate or
key rights”.276 In particular, that is the case where an important facet of an
individual’s existence or identity is at stake.277 Accordingly, the European Court
of Human Rights pointed out that the convention states have only a narrow
margin of appreciation when it comes to the intimate area of a person’s
sexuality.278 Thus, the Court decided in the case Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United
Kingdom that their dismissal from the Royal Navy after their homosexuality was
discovered together with the intrusive nature of the investigations conducted by
the Military Police into their sexuality infringed their right to privacy under
Section 8 ECHR and could not be justified.279
272 Worwa v. Polonia, no. 26624/95, 27. November 2003, ECHR, § 81 et seq.
273 Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, 29. April 2002, ECHR, § 74.
274 Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02 29. April 2002, ECHR, § 76.
275J. Meyer-Ladewig, Art. 8 EMRK, § 109; J. A. Frowein, in: Vorb. zu Art. 8 - 11 EMRK, marginal
number 16.
276 Connors v. the United Kingdom, no. 66746/01, 27. May 2004, ECHR, § 82.
277 Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, 10. April 2007, ECHR, § 77; X and Y v. the
Netherlands, 26. March 1985, §§ 24, 27, Series A no. 91; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 22
October 1981, Series A no. 45; Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, no. 28957/95, § 90,
ECHR 2002-VI; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, ECHR 2002-III, § 71.
278 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45, p. 21, § 53.
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II. Governmental surveillance
The specificity of government surveillance was discussed early in the German
legal literature.280 The risk of collecting data – even when they are considered
useless – was described in the late 1960’s as the concept of a "mosaic theory".281
This explains the problems caused by the compilation and linking of data. Even
though some information about a person may be useless, a complete personality
profile can be created by combining the data (the assembly of the mosaic).282
Moreover, the fundamental right to informational self-determination and right to
confidentiality and integrity of IT systems supports the exercise of other
fundamental rights:
„Those who must be unsure if deviant behaviour cannot be noticed at any time and
persistently stored, used or passed on will try not to expose themselves by such ways
of behaviour. Who expects that the attending of a meeting or a citizens' initiative is
officially registered and that it thereby causing a risk, will forego a potentially exercise
its corresponding fundamental rights (Section 8, 9 GG283). This would not only affect
the development opportunities of an individual, but also the public welfare, because
the right to self-determination is an elementary requirement for the functionality of a
free democratic basic order which is founded on the legal capacity and the citizen’s
ability of participation“.284
This potential chilling effect applies equally for the South African Constitution
since these are not structural issues, but rather describe the general problem of
data collection. Thus, comparisons to the German legal situation can be drawn.
280 See D. Jesch, Gesetz und Verwaltung, p. 132; H.-J. Papier, Die finanzrechtlichen
Gesetzesvorbehalte und das grundgesetzliche Demokratieprinzip, p. 16 et seq.; E. Schwan, in:
VerwArch 1975, p. 126 et seq.
281 W. Schmidt, in: JZ 1974, p. 242; P. Simitis, in: DVR 1972, p. 161; U. Seidel, Datenbanken und
Persönlichkeitsrecht, p. 66 et seq.; E. Schwan, in: VerwArch 1975, p. 133.
282 C. Kulwicki, Verfassungswandel, p. 215 et seq.
283 Section 8 GG is the freedom of assembly, section 9 GG the freedom of association.
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1. Factors for the proportionality test
a) The case of Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of
South Africa
Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa sets a list of
considerations to determine whether a limitation of the right to privacy is
justifiable. The proportionality test requires a stronger justification if any of the
following factors are present: When an information has been obtained in an
intrusive manner (this is for example not the case if it had been volunteered by a
member of the public), when the information is about intimate aspects of a
person’s life, when it involves data which is provided by applicant
himself/herself for one purpose and used for another, when an information led
to the measure and is not derived from a measure and when an information is
disseminated to the press or the general public or persons from whom the
applicant could reasonably expect such private information would be withheld
or is only communicated to a person with statutory responsibilities and is subject
to requirements of confidentiality.285
The European Court of Human rights takes a similar approach. In the case of S.
and Marper v. the United Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights ruled that
“the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's
enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed
by Section 8 of the Convention. Domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards
to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the
guarantees of this Section. The need for such safeguards is all the greater where
the protection of personal data undergoing automatic processing is concerned,
not least when such data are used for police purposes. Domestic law should
ensure that such data are relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes
for which they are stored; and preserved in a form which permits identification
of the data subjects for no longer than is required for the purpose for which those
285 Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa, 1998 (7) BCLR 880 (CC),
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data are stored. Domestic law must also afford adequate guarantees that retained
personal data was efficiently protected from misuse and abuse.”286 This is
according to the European Court of Human Rights especially “valid as regards the
protection of special categories of more sensitive data and more particularly of
DNA information, which contains the person's genetic make-up of great
importance to both the person concerned and his or her family”.287 The
“transmission of data to and their use by other authorities, which enlarges the
group of persons with knowledge of the personal data intercepted and can lead
to investigations being instituted against the persons concerned, constitutes a
further separate interference with the applicants’ rights under Section 8”
ECHR.288
b) Measures carried out to access, observe or record communication and
other non-official information without a person’s consent or awareness
The Bundesverfassungsgericht regards measures that are carried out to access,
observe or record communication and other non-official information without a
person’s consent or awareness as particularly serious. 289 An infringement on the
fundamental right to “confidentiality and integrity of IT systems” increases in
severity when encryption technologies are used, since a “frustration of
informational self-protection" takes place.290 This jurisprudence is justified by
the fact that the holder of the fundamental right has, due to the nondisclosure,
only a limited number of possibilities to take legal action against the activity.
Since the affected person knows nothing about the measure, he/she is not able
286 S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, no. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 04. December 2008, ECHR, §
103.
287 S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, no. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 04. December 2008, ECHR, §
103.
288 Weber and Saravia v. Germany, no. 54934/00, 29. June 2006, ECHR, § 79.
289 See: BVerfGE 107, 299 (321) [Telefonverbindungsdaten]; BVerfGE 115, 320 (353)
[Rasterfahndung II]; BVerfGE 118, 168 (197 et seq.) [Kontostammdaten]; BVerfGE 120, 378 (402
et seq.) [Automatisierte Kennzeichenerfassung]; BVerfG NJW 2006, 976 (981); D. Lorenz, in:
Dolzer/Kahl/Waldhoff/Graßhof (eds), Bonner Kommentar, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 409;
H. D. Jarass, in: Jarass/Pieroth, Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 60a.
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to take preventive legal action.291 Moreover, there is the danger that the
fundamental right holder can’t take subsequent legal action, as this requires that
he/she be informed about the measure.292 Consequently, he/she can neither
work towards reducing the intensity of intervention nor eliminate it for the
future by taking a successfully legal action.293 In contrast, an open measure gives
the person in question not only the possibility to adapt his/her behaviour, but
also the chance to take action against it, or at least the opportunity to make sure
that the measure stays within the legal framework; if necessary with the
assistance of a lawyer.294 Thus, a secret measure also infringes the guarantee of
effective legal protection [section 19(4) GG].295 As a result, a secret measure has
to be the exception in a state which is governed under the rule of law and forces
the authorities according to the principle of proportionality to a special
justification.296
The European Court of Human Rights points out, “that when balancing the
interest of the respondent state in protecting its national security through secret
surveillance measures against the seriousness of the interference with an
applicant’s right to respect for his or her private life, it has consistently
recognised that the executive enjoy a fairly wide margin of appreciation in
choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national
security“.297 However, the European Court of Human Rights indicates that “a
system of secret surveillance for the protection of national security may
undermine or even destroy democracy under the cloak of defending it”.298 Thus,
291 BVerfGE 113, 348 (383 et seq.) [Vorbeugende Telekommunikationsüberwachung]; BVerfGE 118,
168 (197 et seq.) [Kontostammdaten]; BVerfGE 120, 274 (325) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
292 BVerfGE 120, 378 (403) [Automatisierte Kennzeichenerfassung]; similar: BVerfGE 113, 348 (383
et seq.); [Vorbeugende Telekommunikationsüberwachung]; BVerfGE 118, 168 (197 et seq.)
[Kontostammdaten].
293 BVerfGE 120, 378 (403) [Automatisierte Kennzeichenerfassung].
294 BVerfG NJW 2006, 976 (981).
295 BVerfGE 113, 348 (384) [Vorbeugende Telekommunikationsüberwachung].
296 BVerfGE 118, 168 (197) [Kontostammdaten].
297 Weber and Saravia v. Germany, no. 54934/00, 29. June 2006, ECHR, § 106; Klass v. Germany,
no. 5029/71, 06. September 1978, ECHR, § 49; Leander v. Sweden, no. 9248/81 26. March1987,
ECHR, § 59.
298 Weber u. Saravia v. Germany, no. 54934/00, 29. June 2006, ECHR, § 106 with further references;
similar: Klass v. Germany, Series A no. 28, pp. 23-24, §§ 49-50; Camenzind v. Switzerland, 16.
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it has to be made sure that there are adequate and effective guarantees against
abuse.299 Here, the “assessment depends on all the circumstances of the case,
such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds
required for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and
supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law”300
c) Scope of the intrusion
Secondly, the number of fundamental rights affected by the infringement must
be considered, how intense the infringement is and under what premise it
occurs; particularly whether the affected person gave an occasion for it.301 The
Bundesverfassungsgericht focuses specific attention on the potential use of
personal data.302 An informational measure could be seen as a serious
infringement simply because the information could have a high relevance for the
personality of the affected person. Additionally, an information can be gained in
a way that affects the personality significantly, or there are possibilities for
further processing and linking this information and use it for a variety of
purposes.303
Thus, secret online searches of information technology systems are always seen
as severe, since it “provides the acting state agency with access to a stock of data
which may far exceed traditional sources of information in terms of its scope and
diversity. This is a result of the many different possibilities for use offered by
299 Weber u. Saravia v. Germany, no. 54934/00, 29. June 2006, ECHR, § 106 with further references;
similar: Klass v. Germany, Series A no. 28, pp. 23-24, §§ 49-50; Camenzind v. Switzerland, 16.
December 1997, Reports 1997-VIII, pp. 2893-94, § 45.
300Weber and Saravia v. Germany, no. 54934/00, 29. June 2006, ECHR, § 106; Klass v. Germany,
Series A no. 28, pp. 23-24, § 50.
301 BVerfGE 115, 320 (347) [Rasterfahndung II] with reference to BVerfGE 100, 313 (376)
[Telekommunikationsüberwachung I]; BVerfGE 107, 299 (318 et seq.) [Telefonverbindungsdaten];
BVerfGE 109, 279 (353) [Großer Lauschangriff].
302 BVerfGE 100, 313 (376) [Telekommunikationsüberwachung I]; BVerfGE 109, 279 (353) [Großer
Lauschangriff]; BVerfGE 113, 348 (382) [Vorbeugende Telekommunikationsüberwachung];
BVerfGE 115, 320 (347) [Rasterfahndung II]; BVerfGE 118, 168 (196 et seq.) [Kontostammdaten].
303 BVerfGE 118, 168 (179) [Kontostammdaten] with reference to BVerfGE 65, 1 (45 et seq.)
[Volkszählung]; BVerfGE 107, 299 (319 et seq.) [Telefonverbindungsdaten]; BVerfGE 109, 279
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complex information technology systems which are associated with the creation,
processing and storage of personal data. In particular, according to the current
habits of use, such appliances are typically used deliberately to also store
personal data of increased sensitivity, for example private text, pictorial or sound
files. The available data stock may include detailed information on personal
circumstances and on the life of the person concerned, the private and business
correspondence made via various communication channels, or diary-like
personal records.”304
2. Increased requirements for justification
If an infringement is severe according to these criteria, the requirement of
proportionality forces the intervening authority to meet higher criteria to justify
them. Thus, the intrusive act must be authorized by an independent authority,
which must be persuaded by evidence on oath that there are reasonable grounds
that the infringement is necessary.305
“[I]rrespective of legitimate expectations of privacy which may be intruded upon in
the process, and without any predetermined safeguards to minimise the extent of such
intrusions where the nature of the investigations makes some invasion of privacy
necessary, section 28(1) gives the inspectors carte blanche to enter any place,
including private dwellings, where they reasonably suspect medicines to be, and then
to inspect documents which may be of the most intimate kind.306
The legal literature mentions further factors for the field of searches and
seizures: First, the authorising law must properly define the scope of the power
of infringement. Second, prior authorisation by an independent authority is
required.307 These measures can generally be used to weaken intense
encroachments of the right to informational self-determination. This can be
304 BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 27.2.2008, marginal number 165.
305 I. Currie/J. de Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, p. 325.
306 Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa & others, 1998 (7) BCLR
880 (CC), 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at para 30.
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deduced from the principle of proportionality itself. Searches and seizures are
particularly severe interventions of the right to informational self-determination.
The goal of this intervention is to figure out data or objects that a person is not
willing to submit to the authorities by himself/herself. In this respect, e.g. secret
online-searches and secret wire-tapings have to be seen as virtual searches as
seizures. Therefore, high hurdles must be applied in these cases. Here, the
German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the German legal literature have
elaborated on these issues and gave further aspects that help to weaken the
infringement. To find out if these criteria can be applied in the South African
Constitutional law, they first have to be delineated (a, b) and then it has to be
found out if they can be transferred to the South African Constitutional law (c).
a) Restrictive interpretation of the concept of risk
In the German Constitutional law, a governmental surveillance cannot only be
based on a suspected criminal activity.308 The factor of proportionality compels
the authorities to establish facts as a basis for the prediction of danger.309 Thus,
a secret online search can only be allowed when there is actual evidence of a
specific threat to a very important legally protected good.310 Here, the
constitutional judges have developed a new concept of risk in the context of the
fundamental right to confidentiality and integrity of IT systems.311 According to
this, “a secret access to an information technology system in the context of a
preventive goal only satisfies the principle of appropriateness if certain facts
indicate a danger posed to a very important legal interest in the individual
case”.312 These "very important interests" are life, limb and freedom of the
individual or “such interests of the public a threat to which affects the basis or
308 BVerfGE 110, 33 (61) [Zollkriminalamt]; BVerfGE 113, 348 (378) [Vorbeugende
Telekommunikationsüberwachung]; BVerfGE 120, 274 (328) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
309 BVerfGE 113, 348 (378) [Vorbeugende Telekommunikationsüberwachung]; BVerfGE 110, 33 (61)
[Zollkriminalamt]; BVerfGE 120, 274 (328) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
310 BVerfGE 120, 274 (328) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
311 L. Drallé, Das Grundrecht auf Gewährleistung der Vertraulichkeit und Integrität
informationstechnischer Systeme, p. 118 et seq.










Proportionality with respect to limitations of the right to privacy
54
the continued existence of the state or the basis of human existence”.313 This
includes the functionality of essential parts of existence-ensuring public supply
facilities,314 like power plants, dams, or central communication facilities.315
A concrete danger is a factual situation in which sufficient probability exists in
an individual case that damage will be caused by specific persons to the interests
protected by the provision in the foreseeable future without action being taken
on the part of the state.316 The Bundesverfassungsgericht has three factors to
determine if a danger is concrete: the individual case, the immanent risk that a
danger will become actual damage and the question if it is the suspected person
who caused the danger. However, information technology system can already be
accessed if it cannot yet be ascertained with sufficient probability that the danger
will arise in the near future, if certain facts indicate a danger posed to a very
important legal interest in the individual case.317 Here, the facts must first permit
a conclusion concerning events which at least by their nature are concrete and
predictable in time, and second allow the conclusion that specific individuals will
be involved about whose identity it is at least known that the surveillance
measures can be deployed against them in a targeted manner and largely
restricted to them.318
b) Procedural compensation
aa) Duty to inform, duty of disclosure and duty of deleting the data
According to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, severe government surveillance
must be based on suitable statutory precautions in order to secure the interests
313 BVerfGE 120, 274 (328) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
314 BVerfGE 120, 274 (328) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
315 See C. Herrmann, Das Grundrecht auf Gewährleistung der Vertraulichkeit und Integrität
informationstechnischer Systeme, p. 73 at footnote 227 with further references.
316 BVerfGE 120, 274 (328 et seq.) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
317 BVerfGE 120, 274 (328 et seq.) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
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of the person concerned under procedural law319 Here, for instance, a duty to
delete the data after the measure or a duty to disclose the measure to the affected
person after the encroachment are suitable ways to compensate severe
infringements.320 Thus, pre-existing laws such as the claim "for information or
submission of files are to be read and interpreted in the context of the importance
of the right to informational self-determination.321
In the case of secret online searches, there must be an independent and neutral
preventive control,322 as they are very intense encroachments of the right to
privacy. This could “guarantee that the decision on a secret investigation measure
takes sufficient account of the interests of the person concerned if the person
concerned himself or herself is unable to take measures in advance to defend his
or her interests because of the secret nature of the measure. In this respect, the
control serves the purpose of the ‘compensatory representation’ of the interests
of the person concerned in the administrative procedure”.323 Judges could most
effectively defend the rights of the affected, since they are personally and
factually independent, and because the law exclusively binds them, judges are the
best and safest option to defend the rights of the person concerned in an
individual case. 324
bb) Protection of the core area of a person’s private life
The core area of a person’s private life has to be protected.325 Unconstitutionally
obtained data from this core area may not be used; particularly in judicial
319 BVerfGE 65, 1 (46) [Volkszählung]; BVerfGE 113, 29 (57 et seq.) [Anwaltsdaten]; BVerfGE 120,
351 (361) [Anspruch auf Auskunft über eine behördliche Datensammlung].
320 BVerfGE 65, 1 (46) [Volkszählung]; BVerfGE 120, 351 (361) [Anspruch auf Auskunft über eine
behördliche Datensammlung]; BVerfGE 113, 29 (57 et seq.) [Anwaltsdaten].
321 U. Di Fabio, in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, marginal number 177. Examples are: §
19(1) No. 1 or § 18 BDSG(1) No. 1 LDSG Rh.-Pf.
322 BVerfGE 112, 305 (319) [Global Positioning System].
323 BVerfGE 120, 274 (332 et seq.) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
324 BVerfGE 120, 274 (332 et seq.) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
325 BVerfGE 44, 353 (383 et seq.) [Durchsuchung Drogenberatungsstelle]; BVerfGE 109, 279 (311 et
seq.) [Großer Lauschangriff]; BVerfGE 113, 348 (390) [Vorbeugende Telefonüberwachung];
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proceedings.326 This core area has to be protected in all statutes which allow
surveillance measures.327 If this law does not have such a provision it might lead
to the result that is not proportional. 328 Given the increasing use of information
technology systems (internet telephony, e-mail, chat, etc.) for the regulation of
personal matters, there is “an increased danger of data being collected which
have highly personal contents”.329 Thus, the Bundesverfassungsgericht considers
special statutory precautions protecting the core area of private life in the event
of secret access to the information technology system of the person concerned as
indispensable.330
The protection of the core area is to be guaranteed in a two-tier protection
concept.331 On the first step, a statutory provision must endeavour to ensure that
collection of data relevant to the core area is avoided as much as possible in terms
of information technology and investigation technique.332 However, in many
cases the relevance of the collected data to the core area cannot be ascertained
prior to or during data collection.333 Thus, the legislature must ensure by means
of suitable procedural provisions on the second step that data which has been
collected relates to the core area of private life, the intensity of the violation of
the core area and its impact on the personality and development of the person
concerned remain as low as possible.334
326 H. D. Jarass, in: Jarass/Pieroth, Grundgesetz, Art. 2 GG, marginal number 63 with reference to
BVerfGE 44, 353 (383 et seq.) [Durchsuchung Drogenberatungsstelle]; BVerfGE 120, 274 (339)
[Online-Durchsuchungen]; BGH NJW 2003, 1729.
327 BVerfGE 113, 348 (390 et seq.) [Vorbeugende Telefonüberwachung].
328 BVerfGE 113, 348 (390 et seq.) [Vorbeugende Telefonüberwachung].
329 BVerfGE 120, 274 (336) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
330 BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 27.2.2008, marginal number 207.
331 BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 27.2.2008, marginal number 214.
332 BVerfGE 120, 274 (338) [Online-Durchsuchungen]; BVerfGE 113, 348 (391-392) [Vorbeugende
Telekommunikationsüberwachung]; BVerfGE 109, 279 (318, 324) [Großer Lauschangriff].
333 BVerfGE 120, 274 (337) [Online-Durchsuchungen].
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cc) Application to South African Constitutional law
The mentioned categories (duty of disclosure and duty of deleting data,
protection of the core area of a person's private life, restrictive interpretation of
the concept of risk and procedural compensation with the duty to inform) could
be transferred into the South African constitutional law for secret infringements.
These could dilute the effect of intrusions into privacy. In this respect, the
problem is not structural, but factual: Also in the South African law the holder of
the fundamental right has due to the nondisclosure of the measure only a limited
number of possibilities to take legal action against it. Since the affected person
knows nothing about the measure, he/she is also in South African law not able to
take preventive legal action. Moreover, there is also in South African cases the
danger that the fundamental right holder cannot take subsequent legal action,
since this requires as well that he/she be informed about the measure. This
means that, he/she can neither work towards reducing the intensity of
intervention nor eliminate it for the future by taking a successfully legal action.
Moreover, the problem of government surveillance can no longer be considered
regionally, but must be seen in a global context because of the possibility of global
access to computers.
3. Individual cases
a) In South African law
In the context of crime prevention the South African courts and legal literature
the reporting requirements concerning information about child abuse335 and
mental patients who are dangerous to others336 usually outweigh the interests of
a potential offender to his/her right to informational self-determination.337 In tax
law, South African authorities are usually permitted to gather information about
335 Child Care Act 74 of 1983 s 42; Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993, s 4.
336 Mental Health Act 18 of 1973, s 13.
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a citizen which are necessary for the collection of income tax.338 The gathering of
information reasonably required for official statistical and census purposes339 is
generally consistent with the fundamental right to informational self-
determination.340
b) In the European Convention on Human Rights
According to case law of the European Court of Human Rights every person has
“a vital interest, protected by the Convention, in receiving the information
necessary to know and to understand their childhood and early development”.341
This right doesn’t only exist in the character-forming stage of a human. Thus, the
European Court of Human Rights decided that even a 67-year-old applicant has
the right to know his parentage.342 The court found that even if this person has
been able to develop his “personality in the absence of certainty as to the identity
of his biological father, it must be admitted that an individual’s interest in
discovering his parentage does not disappear with age, quite the reverse.”343
On the contrary, “it must be borne in mind that confidentiality of public records
is of importance for receiving objective and reliable information, and that such
confidentiality can also be necessary for the protection of third persons. Under
the latter aspect, a system like the British one, which makes access to records
dependent on the consent of the contributor, can in principle be considered to be
compatible with the obligations under Section 8, taking into account the State’s
margin of appreciation. The Court considers, however, that under such a system
the interests of the individual seeking access to records relating to his private and
family life must be secured when a contributor to the records either is not
available or improperly refuses consent. Such a system is only in conformity with
338 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.
339 Statistics Act 66 of 1976.
340 D. McQuid-Mason, in: Constitutional law of South Africa, Chapter 38.3 (a) (i) (bb).
341 Odièvre v. France, no. 42326/98, 13. February 2003, ECHR, § 47.
342 Jäggi v. Switzerland, no. 58757/00, 13. July 2006, ECHR, § 40.
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the principle of proportionality if it provides that an independent authority
finally decides whether access has to be granted in cases where a contributor
fails to answer or withholds consent.”344












It has been shown that proportionality plays a major role in the South African
Constitution and the German Grundgesetz. A full comparison is not possible, as
the problem of proportionality on justifications for infringements of the right to
privacy is largely shaped by case law, and decided cases in the various
jurisprudences are not absolutely identical. Nonetheless, strong similarities can
be ascertained. In both jurisprudences the proportionality test is categorized
into government surveillance and other encroachments to better determine the
intensity of interventions and the consequential justification criteria.
In the area of informational self-determination, a comparison between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of South Africa has shown that
while the jurisprudence of the German allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht is slightly
more sophisticated, both countries are moving in the same direction. In this
respect, it is likely both rights will become increasingly equal in the years to
come. Here, secret measures are to be regarded as particularly serious, especially
because a person has no opportunity to make use of legal remedies. Thus, the
categories which the German Bundesverfassungsgericht has worked out (duty of
disclosure and duty of deleting the data and protection of the core area of a
person's private life restrictive interpretation of the concept of risk, procedural
compensation with the duty to inform) to reduce the intensity of the
encroachments of the fundamental rights could also be used in the South African
constitutional law, since there are no structural differences and those measures
would also reduce the severity of a secret infringement of section 14 of the 1996
constitution.
Within the context of other measures both the German Bundesverfassungsgericht
and the South African Constitutional Court take the view that every person must
remain an absolutely protected area of privacy. The state must never and under












spheres exhaustively, but list certain areas that receive absolute protection. It has
been shown that a conclusive definition cannot be established, mostly due the
breadth of the concept of a “protected personal sphere of life" and the rapidly
changing social and moral value system. In the other cases, the factor of
proportionality forces the authorities in both jurisdictions to overcome high
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